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This paper examines the historic and present obstacles for achieving social mobility in the United 
States, especially for African-Americans. It examines federal welfare and housing policy from 
the New Deal to present day and finds that federal efforts to improve the social and economic 
outcomes for low-income people have been undermined by racial discrimination, devolution of 
authority to the states, an imbalanced tax code, and ineffective housing policy. This paper rec-
ommends improving low-income social mobility through tax and policy reforms and new federal 
programs centered on a federal job guarantee and an asset-based approach to welfare. 
 
 
Thesis Reviewers: Dr. Jacob Straus, Marilyn Serafini, Dr. Kathryn Wagner Hill and  












This paper is dedicated to my family. I am eternally grateful for your love and support. Thank 
you to my husband, Matthew Campbell, daughter, Griffin, future son, Jack. Thank you to my 
parents, Joan Griffin McCabe and Jim McCabe. Thank you to my sisters, Kate McCabe and 



















Chapter 1: How the Democratic Party Lost the Battle Over Welfare………….11 
 
Chapter 2: The Federal Government: A Boon or Bust for American Homeown-
ership?.................................................................................................................49 
 
Chapter 3: Building Wealth: The Promise of Individual Development Ac-
counts…………………………………………………………………………..78 
 


























At the end of World War II, William Griffin returned home from serving in the Pacific 
Front for the United States Army. In his first years back, Griffin finished his bachelor's degree 
from Loyola University and married his high school girlfriend, Jane Griffin. At the beginning of 
their married life, the couple bought their first house on Taylor Avenue in Oak Park, Illinois. 
They lived there and had four children while Griffin worked as a police officer and detective in 
downtown Chicago. While working for the police department, Griffin earned his legal degree at 
night from DePaul University and would eventually become a lawyer for the city of Chicago. As 
their family grew, the couple sold their first home and moved to a new development further into 
the suburbs. They received help for the downpayment from Jane’s parents in order to build their 
new home, expansive enough for their now fully grown family of nine. Griffin would continue to 
live in the house he and Jane built in the Chicago suburb of Inverness for thirty years raising 
their family, until he passed away in 1989.  
 This brief life story is my grandfather’s and while it is missing many details of his life 
including his personal hardships and triumphs, it is also emblematic of a certain privilege. Wil-
liam Griffin was white and his racial privilege in so many ways enabled him to lead a comforta-
ble and successful life. Because of his skin color, Griffin was able to attend three institutions of 
higher education as they simultaneously denied entry to millions of African-Americans. He was 
able to use the postwar G.I. Bill to afford his graduate degree program, when thousands of black 
WWII veterans, especially southern-born, were denied access to college due to local resistance 
and institutional barriers.1 He was able to move his family within Cook County, Illinois with 
 
1 Sarah Turner and John Bound, “Closing the Gap or Widening the Divide: The Effects of the G.I. Bill and 
World War II on the Educational Outcomes of Black Americans” (National Bureau of Economic Research, June 





ease when hundreds of racial covenants restricted the free movement of non-whites.2 To that end, 
he was able to secure home loans when financing for black families was severely restricted due 
to government condoned redlining which persisted through the late 1960s.3  
Additionally, he and my grandmother were able to start their life in homeownership with 
a gift from my great-grandparents, which reflects a larger reality surrounding racial gaps in in-
herited wealth.4 Finally, in the course of my grandfather’s life, he experienced no employment 
discrimination and was able to secure a middle-class job with a career ladder. In stark contrast, 
African-Americans have been systematically discriminated against or outright denied employ-
ment in high-wage occupations since America’s founding and through the present day.  
This snapshot of a life is meant to illustrate the myriad points of privilege white Ameri-
cans have enjoyed over their black and brown counterparts, frequently with the aid of govern-
ment programs. The stepping stones of the American Dream have thus never been equally avail-
able to people of color while the economic benefits given to whites have transferred to their off-
spring, generation after generation. The purpose of this thesis portfolio is to understand how fed-
eral policies, specifically with regard to welfare and housing, have unequally provided opportu-
nities to white people while inhibiting the social mobility of African-Americans. This portfolio 
also offers recommendations for how the federal government can reform major tenets of its wel-
fare and housing policy. Through an inclusive assets-based approach, these recommendations 
include 1) investing in low-income savings programs known as Individual Development Ac-
 
2 “Racial Restriction and Housing Discrimination in the Chicagoland Area,” Digital Chicago (Lake Forest 
College, 2018), https://digitalchicagohistory.org/exhibits/show/restricted-chicago/chicago-map. 
3 Richard Rothstein, The Color of Law: a Forgotten History of How Our Government Segregated America. 
New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, a division of W.W. Norton & Company, 2018, 107-108.  
4 Fabian T Pfeffer and Alexandra Killewald, “Generations of Advantage. Multigenerational Correlations in 
Family Wealth” (Oxford University Press on behalf of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, February 7, 





counts to promote homeownership and 2) increasing the federal minimum wage to enable greater 
personal savings.  
The three portfolio papers here employ a variety of research methods and materials. The 
first chapter discusses the historical causes and consequences of the welfare policies of four in-
fluential presidents: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Lyndon Baines Johnson, Ronald Reagan, and 
Bill Clinton. In this case study format, a historical explanatory and evaluative approach is under-
taken. The second content chapter discusses two of the federal government’s major housing poli-
cies: the mortgage tax deduction and the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program with re-
spect to their impact on homeownership rates using the policy evaluative model. The third and 
final chapter, analyzes individual development accounts and the federal minimum wage and pro-
vides recommendations for reform and expansion, utilizing the policy prescriptive model. In 
each chapter, primary source government data from Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, 
Assets for Independence, Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher annual reports are reviewed. In ad-
dition, secondary sources from leading scholars, think-tanks, and nonprofits are invoked to pro-
vide necessary research insights and commentary.  
Before going into more detail as to the outline of the thesis portfolio, it is useful to better 
understand the nature of the research problem itself. Focusing on the 20th century period, this 
paper investigates several federal housing and welfare policies and their differential impact on 
people’s abilities to become socially mobile and accumulate wealth. The term social mobility is 
used here as an individual’s ability to improve their class status by moving into a higher income 
group. Wealth is defined as one’s total assets minus their debts; it is importantly distinguished 
from income which is the sum of one’s wages. Bearing in mind that class status varies by region-





class group. The income range considered middle class for a family of three as of 2018 was be-
tween $45,200 to $135,600. The range for upper-class families was over $135,000 and the range 
for lower-class families was below $45,200.5 Over the past half century, severe gaps in both in-
come and wages have resulted in a diminished ability to climb the class ladder for people of col-
or especially. This paper posits that federal housing and welfare policies have caused and exac-
erbated these class and racial disparities while promoting policies which reify class and racial 
privilege.  
The issues of income and wealth inequality in the United States are among the most acute 
in the world. A 2015 report from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) found that the richest 10 percent of American households earned about 28 percent of the 
country’s income. Worse than the income stratification though is the wealth divide, with the top 
10 percent of U.S. households owning 76 percent of all national wealth.6 After only three years, 
as of 2018, the U.S.’s wealth disparities deepened further with the richest 10% of households 
owning 79% of total wealth.7 Decades in the making, from the roughly three decade period of 
1989-2016 the wealth gap between America’s richest and poorest families more than doubled.8 
As later chapters will explain in more detail, the racial wealth gaps which exist in the U.S. are 
 
5 Rakesh Kochhar, “The American Middle Class Is Stable in Size, but Losing Ground Financially to Upper-
Income Families” (Pew Research Center, September 6, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2018/09/06/the-american-middle-class-is-stable-in-size-but-losing-ground-financially-to-upper-income-
families/, 1 
6 Christopher Ingraham, “If You Thought Income Inequality Was Bad, Get a Load of Wealth Inequality,” 
The Washington Post (WP Company, May 21, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/05/21/the-top-10-of-americans-own-76-of-the-stuff-and-its-
dragging-our-economy-down/, 1.  
7 Carlotta Balestra, “Inequalities in Household Wealth across OECD Countries: Evidence from the OECD 
Wealth Distribution Database,” June 20, 2018, 
https://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=SDD/DOC(2018)1&docLanguage=En, 
14.  





startling as well, with the most recent data showing that the median net worth of a white family 
is nearly ten times more than that of a black family, or $171,000 compared to $17,150.9  
The persistence of income and wealth gaps is a root cause of social immobility, contrib-
uting to intergenerational poverty and undermining the egalitarian principles of the American 
Dream. At the end of the day, this means that the family you are born into and their relative 
wealth status has a significant bearing on your lot later in life. For instance, if you are born into a 
high-wealth family today, you are over six times more likely to become a high-wealth adult than 
a child born into a low-wealth family. Conversely, this also means that children born into low 
income distributions are much more likely to stay there than to ascend. Research shows that over 
41 percent of children living in households in the bottom quartile stay there as adults and less 
than 9 percent reach the top quartile by adulthood. In contrast, 76 percent of children born into 
households at the top wealth quartile remain in the top half of the overall distribution by adult-
hood, with the majority of this group remaining at the very top.10  
Beyond the entrenched class obstacles which exist in society overall, examining racial 
demographics reveals that the path towards upward mobility becomes even more impenetrable 
and volatile for black individuals. For instance, African-Americans born into the lowest income 
households have a 44 percent chance of remaining there as adults, compared to 41 percent over-
all. And 75 percent of African American children born into families at the bottom of the wealth 
distribution are likely to stay in the lower half as adults, compared to 54 percent for whites. Tak-
en together, while the poorest whites have a nearly 50-50 chance of ascending from the bottom 
 
9  Kriston McIntosh, Emily Moss, Ryan Nunn, and Jay Shambaugh, “Examining the Black-White Wealth 
Gap.” Brookings, February 27, 2020. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/02/27/examining-the-black-
white-wealth-gap/, 1.  
10 Dalton Conley and Rebecca Glauber, “Wealth Mobility and Volatility in Black and White” (Center for 






quartile to the top half of the wealth distribution, blacks only have one in four odds.11 Over the 
lifespan, the likelihood of upward mobility for black Americans continues to prove more elusive 
than for whites. White adults aged 25-45 years old living in the bottom wealth quartile, had a 44 
percent likelihood of remaining there 20 years later; for black adults, this likelihood was over 
two in three, or 68 percent.12 Not only is it harder for black children and adults to become up-
wardly mobile compared to their white counterparts, black families have a much harder time 
holding onto their wealth.  
In fact, African-Americans and American Indians experience the highest rates of down-
ward mobility of all racial groups. Compared to white children, black children decline in terms 
of relative wealth by approximately 13 percentiles, regardless of their parents’ starting wealth 
status. This figure holds true for black children born in the top 1 percent of the wealth distribu-
tion. When compared to white children born at the top of the income distribution who are five 
times as likely to stay at the top than fall to the bottom, black children have one in two odds of 
falling to the bottom. What this reveals is that even black children from high-income or high-
wealth families are not insulated from the overall downward mobility experienced by blacks as a 
racial group.13  
The black-white disparities in social mobility and wealth can be traced to disparities in 
inherited wealth as well. Inheritances include transfers of cash, businesses, homes and other real 
estate. According to survey data of 5,000 households from the 1999-2007 period, it is estimated 
that racial differences in inheritances accounts for twelve percent of the black-white wealth 
 
11 Conley and Glauber, “Wealth Mobility and Volatility,” 12.  
12 Conley and Glauber, “Wealth Mobility and Volatility,” 18. 
13 Raj Chetty et al., “Race and Economic Opportunity in the United States: An Intergenerational Perspec-





gap.14 This inheritance factor can be attributed to vast differences in the incidence and sum of 
inheritances received in black and white families. Recent data from 2016 show that white house-
holds (aged 30-59) are much more likely to receive inheritances compared to black households; 
twenty-three percent compared to nine percent respectively. The amounts inherited vary widely 
as well, with the inheritance of white families averaging $246,000 compared to $107,000 for 
black families.15 Inherited wealth is important to attend to because inherited wealth, like all 
wealth, can be tapped into to grow more wealth. Therefore, if disparities in inherited wealth ex-
ist, it is likely that disparities in overall wealth will continue into perpetuity without policy inter-
vention.  
Though social mobility is inhibited by a variety of interrelated and compounding factors 
such as lack of access to healthcare, nutrition, quality education, among others - our interest here 
is to discuss how the federal government has impeded social mobility particularly for people of 
color through ineffective and discriminatory welfare and housing policies. Secondly, this paper 
recommends federal investment in incentivized low-income savings plans geared towards home-
ownership purchases, coupled with increases in the federal minimum wage as a two-prong ap-
proach to remediating the current class and racial wealth stratification.   
In the wake of the 2009 mortgage foreclosure crisis, one might give pause to a federal 
policy encouraging low-income homeownership. However, homes continue to represent most 
Americans’ most valuable asset. Moreover, research points to homeownership as a leading cause 
of the racial wealth gap with white families more than ten times as likely to be homeowners than 
 
14 Signe-Mary McKernan et al., “Do Financial Support and Inheritance Contribute to the Racial Wealth 
Gap?” (Urban Institute, September 2012), https://www.urban.org/research/publication/do-financial-support-and-
inheritance-contribute-racial-wealth-gap, 2. 
15 Thompson, Jeffrey P, and Gustavo A Suarez. Working paper. Updating the Racial Wealth Gap. Divi-
sions of Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs Federal Reserve Board, November 17, 2017. 





black families and homeownership and usual income accounting for 80-90 percent of the black-
white wealth gap.16 Further research illustrates that in spite of the steep losses of the Great Re-
cession, homeownership remains a financially wise investment for all families, including Afri-
can-Americans who yield average net worth gains of $6,457 per year of homeownership.17  
Let us now turn to a more descriptive roadmap of the thesis portfolio beginning with the 
first thesis paper entitled: “How the Democratic Party Lost the Battle Over Welfare”. Beginning 
with President Roosevelt’s exclusion of black dominated jobs in the Social Security Act of 1935 
and the devolution of welfare administration to state authorities under the Aid to Families with 
Children program, the federal government absconded its responsibility to creating equitable wel-
fare policy. Though President Johnson is similarly considered a figure who sought to uplift the 
poor through the Great Society programs, his administration was similarly plagued by a devolu-
tion of federal authority and also a reliance on the private sector to create jobs which did not ma-
terialize in career-tract employment for African-Americans in particular. Under President 
Reagan, welfare policy shifted sharply towards a demonization of recipients and a more overt 
assault on black recipients, ultimately slashing funds from the largest social insurance programs. 
Operating under a similar rhetorical strategy of criminalizing welfare participants, President 
Clinton signed the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families establishing the first federal man-
date for welfare work requirements, resulting in precipitous drops in caseloads. The four presi-
dential case studies unearth a federal policy crippled by devolution of authority to states, en-
trenched racism both latent and overt, and a lack of aggressive policy for social mobility. 
 
16 Thompson and Suarez, “Updating the Racial Wealth Gap,” 28-29, 35-37. 
17 Christopher E Herbert, Daniel T McCue, and Rocio Sanchez-Moyano, “Is Homeownership Still an Ef-
fective Means of Building Wealth for Low-Income and Minority Households? (Was It Ever?)” (Joint Center for 






Federal housing policy over the past half century has been similarly mired by a lack of 
commitment towards upward mobility for the poorest class. The second paper in this thesis port-
folio, titled: “The Federal Government: A Boon or Bust for American Homeownership?” focuses 
on two policies in particular which have proved unsuccessful at mitigating class and racial 
wealth gaps. The Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program is one such program that treats 
housing instability in a symptomatic short-term fashion and does little to change the long-term 
mobility outcomes for people in poverty. A more effective and long-term approach to housing 
stability would focus on helping renters become homeowners and in turn build equity and gener-
ational wealth. Such a fundamental shift in federal priorities may require new funding sources 
such as by defunding or vastly reforming the mortgage interest deduction which currently subsi-
dizes higher income households and does little to promote homeownership. Complementary pol-
icies which would promote low-income homeownership and greater social mobility include an 
incentivized matching savings programs and increasing the federal minimum wage which is the 
focus of the third thesis paper.  
The third paper in this portfolio is entitled: “Building Wealth: The Promise of Individual 
Development Accounts” and focuses on Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) which are 
savings plans targeted at low-income earners. They also feature a matching component funded 
by a government agency or other organization to incentivize saving and buoy resources. Individ-
ual development accounts represent an assets-based approach to welfare intended to support 
people in developing long-term assets and financial stability. A federal policy focused on build-
ing low-income assets is only possible however as part of a broader strategy which includes in-





low wage workers, particularly on women of color. By strengthening minimum wage standards, 
more people will be in secure enough financial positions to save for future assets. 
The global pandemic has brought to light for many people the racial inequities in our so-
ciety, as people of color are disproportionately employed in the highest risk but lowest paid 
frontline jobs while suffering the worst health outcomes. In this same moment, masses are de-
manding justice for the murder of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and Rayshard Brooks among 
countless other African-Americans killed by police, at rates 3.5 times higher than whites.18 As 
what may be the largest protest movement the nation has ever seen takes place, the time is ripe 
for change and concrete action.19 Lawmakers and other political leaders should not take this 
moment for granted. Rather, leaders must seize this opportunity to rectify the egregious and sys-
temic injustices which have defined the federal government since its inception to create a social-








18 Osagie K. Obasogie, “Perspective | Police Killing Black People Is a Pandemic, Too.” The Washington 
Post. WP Company, June 5, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/police-violence-
pandemic/2020/06/05/e1a2a1b0-a669-11ea-b619-3f9133bbb482_story.html. 
19 Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui, and Jugal K. Patel. “Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest Movement 






Chapter 1: How the Democratic Party Lost the Battle Over Welfare 
Introduction 
On August 22nd, 1996, Democratic President Bill Clinton signed the Personal Responsi-
bility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) into law. His signature ended one 
of the longest existing entitlement programs in the country’s history, first created by President 
Roosevelt in 1935, the Aid to Dependent Children program (ADC). On the Senate floor debating 
the PRWORA legislation, Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA) described it as, “legislative child 
abuse”20 and “cruelty written large into law”.21 Even in the face of a report declaring that one 
million children would be forced into poverty as a direct result of the law’s passage, Clinton ac-
quiesced to the Republican authored bill, effectively signing on to Newt Gingrich’s Contract 
with America.22 In the aftermath of the PRWORA legislation, Republican leaders hailed the law 
as a major achievement as Democratic members of Congress continued to raise concerns.23  
Beyond the political implications, the real impact of PRWORA is felt by families and 
young children. Under PRWORA, recipients are cut off from federal aid after five years and 
work requirements are triggered after two years; no matter your children’s age, your access to 
health care, or your costs of childcare. The legislation undermines the American ideal of a social 
safety net which stabilizes our democracy and upon which millions of people rely.  
Clinton’s decision to sign PRWORA was a watershed moment in the history of welfare 
programming. It was so ideologically profound and unnerving that several of Clinton’s top ad-
 
20 Peter Edelman, “The Worst Thing Bill Clinton Has Done.” The Atlantic. August 21, 2015. Accessed Oc-
tober 12, 2017.  
21 Brendon O’Connor, A Political History of the American Welfare System: When Ideas Have Consequenc-
es. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004: 226. 
22 Edelman, "The Worst Thing Bill Clinton Has Done."  
23 John F. Harris and John E. Yang, “Clinton to Sign Bill Overhauling Welfare.” The Washington Post. 





visers quit in its aftermath, shocked as they were at the president’s decision.24 Upon closer exam-
ination however, is possible to chart the degeneration and devolution of federal welfare policy in 
the United States from the very beginning. Moving backwards in time, it is clear to see how 
Reagan’s welfare legacy influenced Clinton’s, and how Johnson’s failed Great Society programs 
gave rise to many Reagan voters. Looking back to the New Deal era, it is possible to see how 
missed opportunities to build a comprehensive social safety net rendered Johnson’s ambitious 
War on Poverty a precarious enterprise from the very beginning. Clinton’s decision to sign 
PRWORA in the leading months up to his re-election bid was inextricably linked to the Demo-
cratic Party’s feeble anti-poverty platform which though more proactive than their Republican 
counterparts’ was still no where near as aggressive as necessary to uplift the poor. 
This paper draws on existing welfare reform research as well as rhetorical analysis of 
presidential speeches to answer the question: “How did the Democratic Party lose the battle over 
welfare?”. This question assumes that the Democratic Party has indeed already lost the battle, but 
what exactly was lost and how did the party lose their grip?  This paper contends that the Demo-
cratic Party had numerous opportunities throughout the 21st century to assert an aggressive anti-










How did the Democratic Party lose the battle over welfare? To understand how and why 
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act became law, it is im-
portant to examine the Democratic Party’s successes and limitations within each landmark period 
of welfare reform. This literature review previews leading scholars’ views on the Democratic 
Party’s successes and failures at articulating and enacting effective welfare policy. The review is 
organized chronologically, beginning with President Roosevelt’s New Deal agenda.  
Roosevelt’s administration is simultaneously praised by the political left and critiqued by 
the political right for its massive expansion of federal government aid and regulations. What is 
often overlooked however, is the legacy of bureaucratic and institutional racism built into the 
very language of New Deal laws. For instance, entitlements like Social Security discriminated 
against African-Americans in obscured but highly calculated ways. The 1935 Social Security Act 
(SSA) allowed for local administration of benefits, enabling Southern states to discriminate 
against black recipients in order to service their local economies low-wage system.25 Looking 
further back, systemic discrimination can also be found in the predecessor of AFDC benefits: 
mother’s pensions. Mother’s pensions were championed by white, middle-upper class Protestant 
women who sought the pension program as a way to preserve the white race. The pensions fre-
quently excluded families deemed “inferior” or “unsuitable”, such as African Americans, Native 
Americans, and immigrant groups.26 In these early examples of government intervention, schol-
ars reveal that the New Deal era is significant not only because it enlarged the scope and size of 
the federal government but because it institutionalized racism in the federal bureaucracy. Also 
 
25 Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare. 
New York: Vintage Books, 1993: 126. 
26 Deborah E. Ward, The White Welfare State: The Racialization of U.S. Welfare Policy. Ann Arbor: The 





codified into law during this period was the notion that some people deserve government assis-
tance, while others do not; a discriminatory view which persists throughout the 21st century. 
Martin Gilens’s book, Why Americans Hate Welfare Reform, provides important histori-
cal data and analysis about American’s perceptions of welfare in relation to race. Gilens’s data 
shows both that Americans praise the self-reliant virtue and Americans have also long perceived 
blacks as lazy. The stereotype that blacks are lazy dates back to the earliest known research on 
perceptions of racial characteristics from 1933. From this survey of Princeton students, 75% of 
students chose “lazy” as a leading attribute of African-Americans, second only to “supersti-
tious”.27 At the intersection of these two entrenched beliefs is the view that blacks are lazy and 
not self-reliant, true Americans; consequently blacks do not deserve welfare.28  
This misguided conflation of perceptions also leads people to assume that blacks account 
for a radically high number of welfare beneficiaries when in reality, whites account for the ma-
jority of welfare recipients.29 Gilens goes on to highlight the serious implications of these insidi-
ous beliefs on our public policy and more importantly, on people’s lives. He highlights Christo-
pher Howard’s research which shows the policy repercussions of the negative association be-
tween welfare and African-Americans: “states with higher proportions of blacks in their popula-
tions had significantly lower AFDC benefit levels, but similar unemployment benefit levels, 
compared with states with fewer blacks”.30 Gilens’s research demonstrates that discriminatory 
stereotypes have long plagued African Americans’ pursuit of aid and continue to through present 
day.  
 
27 Martin Gilens, Why Americans Hate Welfare: Race, Media, and the Politics of Antipoverty Policy. Chi-
cago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2000: 157. 
28 Gilens, Why Americans Hate Welfare, 61, 77. 
29 Gilens, Why Americans Hate Welfare, 68. 





Building on the foundations of the New Deal and the work of his direct predecessor Pres-
ident John F. Kennedy, President Johnson announced his Great Society.31 One major component 
of the Great Society was the War on Poverty which Johnson “fought” with various new and ex-
panded social programs. Most markedly, Johnson greatly expanded access to Roosevelt’s direct 
assistance program, Aid to Dependent Children, which Johnson renamed as the Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC). As part of his War on Poverty arsenal, Johnson loosened eli-
gibility requirements for AFDC resulting in an increase in caseloads from 3 million people in 
1960 to a peak of 10 million in 1970.32 Historians and political scientists range widely in their 
evaluation of the War on Poverty.  
Some scholars view this rise in AFDC participation as evidence of successful government 
intervention and reduction of poverty. Political scientist, John Schwarz, argues that it was pri-
marily government intervention which reduced poverty by 10-14% from the 1960s to the 
1970s.33 Schwarz refutes the role of the private sector in reducing poverty contending that the 
federal government was responsible for lifting 1 in 2 people out of poverty, while the private 
economy was only responsible for aiding 1 in 10 Americans.34 He goes on to argue that politi-
cians did not recognize the issue of an increasingly crowded labor market, caused by higher rates 
of women participants and the baby boomer generation coming of age. By misreading the eco-
nomic landscape, he argues the federal government missed an opportunity to create new public 
 
31 James T. Patterson, “Girding for War on Poverty,” in America's Struggle Against Poverty in the Twenti-
eth Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 10.2307/j.ctvk12r3m, 39. 
32 Eva Bertram, “Democratic Divisions in the 1960s and the Road to Welfare Reform." Political Science 
Quarterly 126, no. 4 (2011): 580. 
33 John E. Schwarz, America's Hidden Success: Reassessment of Twenty Years of Public Policy. WW Nor-
ton & Co., 1984: 32.  





jobs to meet the increased demand for work.35 Of course, not all academics share Schwarz’s pos-
itive assessment and many alternatively view the rise of the AFDC caseloads less as a success 
story and more as a warning sign.  
Charles Murray, a leading conservative scholar, takes on Schwarz’s analysis directly. In 
his book, Losing Ground, Murray argues that the AFDC program is in part responsible for creat-
ing a black underclass. He condemns the Great Society for creating a self fulfilling prophecy of 
dependence through “The Law of Unintended Rewards”. This law holds that no matter what the 
social program, if government aid is offered as a remedy, a reward for the unwanted behavior is 
automatically triggered.36 Murray disputes Schwarz’s argument that the swelling labor force of 
the 1970s led to a dearth of opportunity for women and minority groups. To repudiate Schwarz, 
Murray points to the near identical labor force participation (LFP) rate between white and black 
youth throughout the 1950s up until the early 1960s. In 1963, the LFP for black youths (aged 16-
24) began to taper off and then dramatically so in 1966.37 The black youth male LFP also stands 
in stark contrast to the LFP of older black males which remained at or near the LFP of their 
white male counterparts.38 Murray explains this decline not as a consequence of larger economic 
forces nor as an outcome of racial bias. Rather, Murray explains the decline in young black male 
LFP during the 1960s as a choice which adversely affected their skill sets, work habits, and work 
records, translating into muted economic opportunities into adulthood.39 Where Murray sees ill-
advised economic choices among black males during the 1960s, other scholars see an awakening 
of political consciousness. 
 
35 Schwarz, America’s Hidden Success, 136. 
36 Charles Murray, Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-1980. New York: Basic Books, 1984: 
212-213. 
37 Murray, Losing Ground, 76. 
38 Murray, Losing Ground, 80. 





Political scientists, Francis Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, argue that political unrest is 
necessary for any whole scale change in American social policy to take place and they believe 
the government should do much more to alleviate the poverty caused by centuries of systemic 
race and gender discrimination. Therefore, unlike Murray, Piven and Cloward embrace the in-
creases in AFDC rolls as a result of Great Society reforms. Moreover, Piven and Cloward argue 
that the rise in welfare participation increased in direct response to just political disorder.40 They 
criticize the government for using welfare as a means of control over oppressed classes of people 
and call for further political resistance to bring about more progressive social reform.  
Beyond the flawed implementation of Great Society policy, external factors also hindered 
the reform’s success. Race riots towards the later half of the decade complicated the relationship 
between black leaders and white liberals, inhibiting their ability to push for more inner-city 
spending.41 Labor unions, typically a dependable Democratic ally, were also divided over sup-
porting many Great Society programs. While the Great Society programs were not as overtly rac-
ist in design as their New Deal counterparts, tense race relations marked by antipathy and self-
preservation among whites undoubtedly stymied the impact of many initiatives.  
Finally, other scholars view the War on Poverty and see not missed opportunities, but a 
misalignment of priorities resulting in mass defection from the party. In the book, Chain Reac-
tion: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American Politics, Thomas Edsall and Mary Ed-
sall explain that in response to the Democratic Party’s 1960s leftward swing towards rights-
based politics, two core voting constituencies shifted away from the party. These blocs were the 
Northern white, often Catholic and European ethnic voters and the lower-income Southern popu-
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list voters.42 Instead of uniting around common conditions of class, race divided voters and the 
Democratic Party lost the 25 year old “bottom-up” New Dealer voting bloc. By the 1964 elec-
tions, the Republican Party was already laying claim to the millions of disaffected voters by 
characterizing the Democratic Party as run by liberal elites.43  
Alienation and anger grew among white working class voters as the civil rights agenda 
shifted from rights towards jobs and material concerns for blacks. Barry Goldwater, George Wal-
lace, and Richard Nixon demonized the Democrat’s liberal ideals and invited the new cadre of 
voters into the Republican Party. The Republicans offered a populist message on race and taxes, 
promising to end reverse discrimination on whites and lower taxes which the public increasingly 
saw as feeding ineffectual social programs. They also cultivated an image as being a pro-family 
party, furthering drawing voters away from the Democrats, especially Southern evangelical 
Christians.The exodus of Democratic Party voters prompted a realignment in the American elec-
torate, transforming the Republican Party from a minority presidential coalition into a majority 
coalition.44 The trends continued into the 1980s, when voter identification with the Democratic 
Party began falling.45  
By the 1980s, neoliberalism began to gain ground as a dominant political doctrine in both 
parties as America’s embrace of big government waned. The rise of President Ronald Reagan’s 
Conservative Coalition is also credited for the neoliberal shift in Democratic politics. Reagan 
capitalized on the growing anti-welfare sentiment in the public by demonizing welfare recipients 
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and praising hard working Americans.46 He went one step further in his embrace of white Amer-
ica by humiliating black America through his public ridiculing of convicted felon Linda Taylor, 
aka, “welfare queen”. Reagan’s calculated rhetorical strategy fed into white’s stereotypes about 
black’s diminished work ethic.47 Democrats offered no defense of welfare programs and in time 
were subsumed by conservative ideology through Clinton’s embrace of neoliberalism and “Third 
Way” politics.  
President Clinton’s formulation of “Third Way” politics solidified the Democratic Party’s 
neoliberal shift. After the loss of Gov. Michael Dukakis to President George H.W. Bush in 1998, 
the mainstream and centrist members of Democratic Party sought to rebrand the party. Supported 
by the Democratic Leadership Council, Clinton espoused a “New Democrat” vision. The New 
Democrats would not be associated with the typical tax-and-spend liberals but would instead 
seek balanced budgets and rein in redistributive spending.48 The New Democrats would not be 
friends of welfare recipients but would in Clinton’s own words: “end welfare as we know it”. 
Through the passage of the PRWORA legislation, Clinton attempted to silence his Republican 
adversaries, solidify his voting base, and ensure a second term in office.49  
 
Methodology 
This paper employs comparative case studies and secondary source analysis to answer the 
question: “How did the Democratic Party lose the battle over welfare?” The case studies examine 
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four modern presidents who shaped the American welfare state: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 
Lyndon Johnson, Ronald Reagan, and Bill Clinton. By analyzing the contributions and limita-
tions of each president and considering how their legacies influenced each other, it is possible to 
trace the expansion and later retrenchment of the welfare system. John Kingdon’s multiple 
streams model of analysis is also employed. Kingdon’s model allows for a nuanced view of the 
interplay between policy, politics, and problems. Through this approach it is possible to under-
stand how the intersection of a national crisis or the public’s mood, policy proposals, and politi-
cal power dynamics and other considerations collide to produce a certain outcome.50 
 
Findings 
Roosevelt’s Complicated Legacy 
It is commonly understood that the era of big government began with President Roose-
velt’s New Deal. Catalyzed by the desperate poverty endured by millions during the Great De-
pression, Roosevelt sought to reduce suffering through direct aid and work relief. In his first term 
in office, Roosevelt created the Works Progress Administration (WPA), the Civilian Conserva-
tion Corps (CCC), and the Public Works Administration (PWA) which together would create 
millions of jobs for the unemployed.51 Roosevelt also ushered in the first national social insur-
ance program with the Social Security Act of 1935. What is less understood however is how the 
economic and racialized tensions within the Democratic Party dually served Roosevelt’s jobs 
agenda in the short term and undermined prospects for a full employment strategy in the long 
term. The legacy of Roosevelt’s tenure is also mired by the racial discrimination his federal gov-
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ernment turned a blind eye to in order to earn the support of Southern Congressmen. Roosevelt’s 
own economically cautious and racially ambivalent leadership prescribed a narrow vision of em-
ployment rights and racial equity, a mantle President Johnson would carry with precarity as he 
tried to navigate his War on Poverty. 
The defining tensions in Roosevelt’s administration emanated from the progressive and 
conservative branches of his party. Louisiana Populist Senator Huey Long posed the first serious 
threat to Roosevelt through his hugely popular “Share Our Wealth” campaign which proposed 
taxes on millionaires, a negative income tax of $5,000, and annual incomes of $2,000 for all 
Americans.52 In response to Long’s populist movement, Roosevelt’s Democratic Party ran secret 
polls to determine the efficacy of Long’s third party candidacy in the 1936 election.53 Feeling the 
pressure from Long, in 1935, Roosevelt asked Congress for nearly $5 billion dollars to create 3.5 
million jobs through the WPA.54  
Francis Townsend, a physician, is also credited for urging Roosevelt in a more interven-
tionist direction. Townsend developed a plan to have the federal government provide a monthly 
pension of $200 for every person aged 60 and older. Townsend’s plan gained traction as his fol-
lowers, Townsendites, comprised of the elderly and reliable voters.55 Feeling the public pressure, 
Roosevelt moved forward with the SSA, though on his own terms. He rebuffed more liberal 
members of his cabinet like Secretary of Commerce Harry Hopkins who advocated for non-
contributory old-age and unemployment benefits as a matter of right. Instead, Roosevelt opted 
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for a less generous contributory social insurance program by which employed workers paid for 
their retirement through taxes.56 The first payments in the 1940s averaged to $58 per month, de-
cidedly less than Townsend’s plan.57 Though the SSA remains a great achievement and corner-
stone of the country’s welfare state, its infancy was corrupted by racial discrimination and eco-
nomic oppression of African-American farm workers and domestic laborers. 
 In order to cajole the Southern Democrats to vote for the new social insurance plan, Roo-
sevelt conceded vast federal authority. He promised little federal oversight, state administration, 
and key exceptions in SSA coverage. Although the President’s Committee on Economic Security 
recommended that all employed persons be eligible for the unemployment and old-age insur-
ance, Southern Senators fought against the measure. In their win to exclude domestic and agri-
cultural workers from coverage, southern employers gained even more coercive power over 
workers. This change disproportionately affected female blacks who worked as domestic labor-
ers and male blacks who worked as farm field hands.58 Without unemployment insurance or old-
age insurance to draw from, workers were forced to remain in the caste-economy predominant in 
the south.59 The discriminatory exclusion from coverage lasted nearly two decades, until the law 
as amended in 1950 and 1954.60  
In a further blow to black laborers in the south, Roosevelt also allowed state and local 
administrators to determine eligibility for the Aid to Families with Children (AFC). This conces-
sion let southern administrators decide who “deserved” public assistance and who did not; ren-
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dering low-wage, tenant farming and domestic work to be the only option available to blacks. In 
fact, the practice of racial and ethnic discrimination in welfare eligibility dates back to the first 
years of public assistance. The Progressive Era mothers pension movement, which the AFC grew 
out of, initially sought the preservation of the white race through aid to widowed mothers. Moth-
ers pensions as a coercive tool of assimilation for immigrant women and children.61 As the 
movement spread to over forty states, moralistic rules for dispensing aid were imposed; shutting 
out unmarried women, immigrants, African-Americans, the poor, and any other deemed to live 
in “unsuitable” homes.62 Building on this existing state structure, Southern states wanted similar 
levels of autonomy in determining eligibility for federal aid. With few regulations and loose 
oversight from the federal government, Southern states were able to restrict African-Americans’ 
access to their rightful federal aid, holding them captive in the low-wage labor economy.63  
By the end of Roosevelt’s presidency, he was becoming decidedly more liberal in his 
economic philosophy and more outspoken about the federal government’s responsibility to 
workers. In his State of the Union Address to Congress in 1944, he outlined what has come to be 
known as the “Second Bill of Rights” or “Economic Bill of Rights”. First on his list was: “The 
right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries or shops or farms or mines of the na-
tion”.64 Roosevelt did not live long enough to work on his declaration of rights. Yet after his 
death in 1945, liberal New Dealers continued to press for more federal intervention in the econ-
omy. They sought a system in which the federal government would increase spending until the 
labor force reached full employment. In the end, the Full Employment Act of 1946 was watered 
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down, stripped of its right to a job provision as well as the goal for full employment. In place of 
these measures, the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) was created to make recommenda-
tions to the White House for the goal of maximum employment.65  
Roosevelt’s New Deal coalition was ultimately unable or unwilling to create a strong 
class consciousness which transcended race, geography, and private interests.66 Even in 1938, 
when Roosevelt tried to purge Southern Democrats from his party by campaigning against them, 
his actions came too late.67 By the time of his own transformation towards the rights of workers, 
exemplified in his “Second Bill of Rights” address, his party still lacked support. The lines were 
drawn and Southern Democrats expected the same deference they enjoyed when the Social Secu-
rity Act was signed protecting their low-wage and discriminatory labor practices. The New Deal-
ers’ early kowtowing to Southern legislators and Roosevelt’s unwillingness to construct a truly 
national welfare state until the end of his time in office highlight the Democratic Party’s predi-
lection for politically convenient solutions as well as white interests over equal justice.68 By the 
“Revolt of 1948,” the rise of the Southern Dixiecrats had severely undermined the Democratic 
coalition. Southern leaders expressed open disdain for President Truman’s civil rights agenda, 
eventually leading to the nomination of Strom Thurmond as a third party candidate for the 
States’ Rights Democratic Party, more commonly known as the Dixiecrats.69 Ultimately, the 
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Roosevelt administration’s preference for placation and the racial divisions within the party 
would undermine future federal efforts on poverty like President Johnson’s Great Society.70  
 
The Promise and Specter of Johnson’s Great Society  
 In the aftermath of President Kennedy’s assassination, Johnson inherited a mandate to 
govern and continue Kennedy’s New Frontier vision for the country. His landslide victory in the 
1964 election over Republican Barry Goldwater and the huge Democratic majorities in Congress 
furthered that mandate. Johnson was able to pass historic civil rights legislation barring discrimi-
nation in employment practices and voting. However, by the middle of the decade Johnson was 
steadily losing his support among whites and blacks alike. For African-Americans, Johnson’s 
War on Poverty was underfunded, mismanaged, and even condescending. For whites, the Great 
Society programs were too narrowly aimed at blacks and ineffective at reducing urban poverty.71 
By the end of the decade, the Democratic Party was fractured by disillusionment amongst both 
the progressive and conservative wings. The Party’s proactive position on welfare entitlements 
for the poor has never recovered. Instead, Johnson’s Great Society legacy continues to fuel con-
servative attacks on government intervention to societal and economic problems. 
Launching his War on Poverty, Johnson was forced to work within a predestined policy 
framework. The shadow of the Southern Democrats and New Deal politics lingered over the 
Democratic Party of the 1960s as a national public employment strategy remained an untenable 
position. Johnson therefore chose to use tax cuts and training programs to encourage private sec-
tor work.72 Johnson also favored constituency-targeted programs as an alternative to national 
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policy and it was this policy targeting blacks in urban areas which would drive whites away from 
the party as well as alienate radical black leaders.73  
Some of the training programs offered to black communities resulted in the “ghetto merry 
go round” in which trainees underwent training that did not help them find jobs and forced them 
into circumstances similar to what they were trying to leave.74 The jobs offered by the private 
sector through heavily subsidized tax deductions did not materialize in significant numbers and 
what work was offered was mostly entry-level.75 The entry-level positions often went unfilled as 
African-Americans sought “ladder jobs”, not low-wage, static positions which they had been rel-
egated to for decades.76 When high wage jobs were offered, such as those in the auto industry, 
black workers applied in droves, pointing to a fundamental flaw in the jobs program’s design.77 
The menial jobs offered were considered summer “riot insurance” to quell unrest in cities and a 
short term solution to a larger problem of high-wage job creation and skills development.78 Fi-
nally, the Community Action Programs which were intended to empower urban communities 
and create local jobs proved ineffectual and poorly managed.79 In response to the failing training 
programs and the dearth of high-paying ladder jobs, Johnson stayed the course in spite of re-
sistance within his own White House and party.  
White House advisers thought that cash transfers, universal family allowances, as well as 
tax increases could salvage the War on Poverty.80 Liberal Congressmen sought to create a public 
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employment program through the existing Office of Economic Opportunity, but were shut down 
as officials saw the task of sustaining public jobs as daunting and potentially inflationary.81 Sec-
retary of Labor Willard Wirtz also proposed a jobs program to replace direct aid but was re-
buffed.82 Johnson demonstrated his preference for the status quo by halting the Labor Depart-
ment’s long-planned reorganization of the Manpower program which would have asserted more 
federal control over job training programs.83 Ultimately, Johnson’s attempts at group-based in-
terventions proved too short-sighted and conventionally designed for the herculean task of re-
versing decades of economic oppression and segregation of African-Americans. Coupled with 
the race riots of the 1960s, white’s negative perception of the targeted urban programs proved the 
final death knell to the War on Poverty. 
Majority white union members also did not support the civil rights friendly AFL-CIO 
leadership; instead viewing interventions for blacks as an unfair advantage.84 Union employers 
had historically provided unemployment insurance and workers compensation benefits directly. 
Therefore, for local organized labor pursuing a national welfare strategy was not in their imme-
diate interest.85 Unions did not support a national jobs strategy either, concerned by the potential 
for millions of new workers to drive down their wages.86 Working class whites, once a strong-
hold of the Democratic Party, were now alienated and many crossed party lines to vote for the 
Nixon/Wallace ticket in 1968.87 In the end, what could have been a class-based coalition among 
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working class blacks and whites was subverted by the federal government’s own efforts and 
Johnson’s inability to make a convincing and widely appealing political argument.  
The race riots of the 1960s drove whites further away from the Democratic Party and to-
wards Republicans who promised law and order. The riots which plagued Johnson’s presidency 
signaled to the white community that the War on Poverty was failing.88 According to a Gallup 
Poll, by the end of the decade only 16% of Americans viewed race as the most important issue 
facing the country down from a high of 52% of respondents in 1965. By the fall of 1966, more 
than half of Americans thought the push for integration was happening too fast.89 Liberals of-
fered little defense of the War on Poverty spending and could provide no antidote to the riots as 
they were also divided over how to proceed.90  
The New Left movement is credited by some scholars as altering the course of the Dem-
ocratic Party with its hyper-focus on the Vietnam War and cultural issues. Over the course of the 
war, progressive sympathizers of the Great Society became adversaries. Later, with the leader-
ship vacuum created by Johnson’s decision not to run for reelection in 1968, Democrats failed to 
build a cohesive coalition. They were split between establishment candidates: incumbent Vice 
President Hubert Humphrey and New Left candidates: Robert Kennedy and Eugene McCarthy. 
Although Humphrey lost to Richard Nixon by small margins in the 1968 election, by 1972 Dem-
ocrats were affiliated with “amnesty, acid, and abortion.” Voters firmly rejected Democratic 
nominee Senator George McGovern who lost to President Nixon by a landslide popular vote 
margin of 23%.91 The New Left counterculture movement is also faulted for laying the ground-
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work for Ronald Reagan’s conservative coalition.92 Taken together, Republicans were able to 
seize on their fractured opposition party and draw on the New Left’s anti-government rhetoric as 
ammunition for their own attacks on big government.93  
 
Reagan’s Revolution and Retrenchment  
By the 1980s, after a period of uncertainty and malaise during the Carter administration, 
Americans were ready for a hopeful voice and vision for the country in the form of Ronald 
Reagan. Whites now viewed the civil rights movement as a successful equalizing force for Afri-
can-Americans. Any subsequent experiences of poverty were due to individual choices and not 
discriminatory policies.94 Reagan capitalized on this ethos and convinced Americans that small 
government and laissez faire economics would liberate Americans from the clutches of welfare 
dependency. He faulted “welfare queens,” symbolized as African-American women as a drain on 
federal reserves and therefore an adversary of American individualism.  
In his first term in office, Reagan made an immediate impact downsizing the size of gov-
ernment. He cut job training funds, AFDC benefits, Food Stamps, Medicaid, and slashed unem-
ployment benefits to their lowest levels since the 1930s.95 In the 1981 Omnibus Budget and Rec-
onciliation Act (OBRA), Reagan won cuts of $680 million per year to the AFDC program 
alone.96 To further minimize the role of the federal government, Reagan attempted to reorganize 
the AFDC and Food Stamp programs into state block grants. The goal behind Reagan’s “New 
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Federalism” was to shrink the welfare state by decentralizing authority.97 Although he was not 
successful in transforming the AFDC entitlements into block grants, his policy moves set prece-
dent for nearly identical welfare reforms to come not long after, under President Clinton. With 
the aid of the Democratic controlled Congress, Reagan was also responsible for passing the Fam-
ily Support Act (FSA) of 1988. The FSA was the first federal law to mandate work requirements 
for welfare recipients and establish rigorous paternity identification requirements.98 Like the 
block grant initiative, the FSA would serve as a launching pad for Clinton’s overhaul of the 
welfare system. 
 Bolstering Reagan’s small government platform was the support he received from the 
Religious Right or Moral Majority. By the 1980s, conservatives were associated with cultural 
issues as much as they were associated with economic ideology and it became hard for a Repub-
lican to win without holding socially conservative views.99 Reagan embraced the role as the 
country’s moral leader and from this pedestal he demoralized welfare recipients and fanned the 
flames against federal government social programs. Through the creation of easily targeted cari-
catures like the “welfare queen”, symbolized as a black woman, Reagan signaled to his base that 
he was a candidate for true (white) hard working Americans who did not need to rely on gov-
ernment help. The Republican Party cast big government spending as a threat which undermined 
both industrious small business owners as well as the entire middle class.100 Demonizing welfare 
recipients was easy fodder for Republicans given the public mood. 
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By the 1980s, the stereotype of the welfare recipient was entrenched as a sexually pro-
miscuous single black mother with children born out of wedlock.101 This stereotype was elevated 
by House Majority Leader Newt Gingrich (R-GA) and the lingering specter of Moynihan Report. 
Many interpreted Moynihan’s finding on the “Negro” family as evidence of the destructiveness 
of single-parent families, especially with women as the head of the household - a feat only ac-
complished with the help of enabling government aid.102 While Moynihan was disturbed by the 
public’s reception to his leaked report, others saw the rise of single-parent families as a leading 
cause of poverty and serious problem in and of itself.103 Gingrich touted similar views in Con-
gress, eventually gaining enough traction to shape Clinton’s welfare reform in the 1990s.104 But 
everyday Americans were not far behind in their distrusting and concerned views about welfare 
dependence, the “culture of poverty”, and their toll on society. 
The predominant view of welfare recipients was that they were too dependent upon the 
state and/or acculturated to a life of poverty. In fact, the majority of Americans believed that 
poor people, blacks, and women should depend on the government less for help and rely instead 
on their own individual initiative105. By the 1980s, opposition had increased for income mainte-
nance or welfare programs like the AFDC.106 The public’s views on welfare seemed to contradict 
their opinions about other social programs and government interventions. For instance, support 
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for social security has never wavered according to polls conducted between 1977-1990.107 And 
in the years preceding Reagan’s presidency, another poll found that 80% of Americans believed 
that the able-bodied people should be removed from welfare rolls and given government jobs if 
the private sector could not provide them.108 But like Johnson, Reagan did not move to create a 
public jobs program and instead set in motion the decentralization of entitlement programs, re-
sulting finally in President Clinton’s PRWORA legislation. 
During the 1980s, the Democratic Party offered little defense of social programs and con-
tinued to struggle in articulating a consistent economic message. Since the Great Society era, 
Democrats vacillated between support over government jobs programs, aiding fading industries, 
and fixing the deficit.109 Compared to the Republicans who were united under the “strict father” 
world view and clear economic message of job creation through tax cuts, Democrats lacked ap-
peal and consistency.110 And they were competing with a Republican party increasingly embold-
ened by their economic message. After 1972 and peaking during the Reagan years, Americans 
strongly associated the Republican Party with stronger economic outcomes; as the “party of 
prosperity”.111 Lagging behind, Democrats tried to reframe the debate over welfare as a matter of 
children’s defense.112  Unlike the activism of the Great Society and Civil Rights era, children’s 
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Clinton’s Capitulation to the GOP 
 Years before President Clinton was elected to office in 1992, he helped craft a new ideo-
logical framework for the Democratic Party under the aegis of the newly formed Democratic 
Leadership Council (DLC). The sense of urgency to create a new Democratic identity grew after 
the party experienced their third presidential loss in a row in 1988. The DLC, an unofficial party 
organization, created the New Democrats faction within the Party. The group sought to shift the 
party towards the center in embrace of neoliberal economic principles, while consciously avoid-
ing the liberal label. The New Democrats were also intent on courting swing white, middle class 
voters and avoiding being pigeonholed as the party of blacks, feminists, and gays.113 Clinton 
worked up the ranks to the party leadership in the DLC and he both shared and promoted the 
group’s moderate, colorblind message. By the time Clinton ran for president in 1992, he had 
honed his centrist message offering a transcendent “Third Way”. 
 In 1996, Clinton signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act, trans-
forming the structure and scope of the country’s federal welfare system. The PRWORA upended 
President Roosevelt and President Johnson’s expansion of entitlements by curtailing federal 
spending, prescribing new time limits on aid, and mandating new work requirements. Paralleling 
the first era of welfare spending when AFC payments were determined by states on the basis of 
individual, frequently racist criteria, the PRWORA devolved significant rulemaking authority to 
the states and placed renewed emphasis on individual morality.   
 Clinton’s welfare reform law devolved spending decisions to the states through a new 
block grant structure. The new block grant program, known as Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF), replaced the longstanding AFDC program, as well as the Emergency Assis-
 





tance (EA), and the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) programs. Before the PRWORA 
was enacted, the federal government reimbursed 100% of state spending for AFDC recipients.114 
Under the new TANF block grants, the federal government allocated a fixed amount of aid mon-
ey per state. This means that in times of economic recession when need for public assistance ris-
es, there will be fewer dollars available as the contingency fund amount is predetermined.115 It is 
also worth noting that the PRWORA also cut the Food Stamps and Supplemental Security In-
come budgets by $50 million dollars over five years.116 
New time restrictions meant that adults could only receive federal aid for a maximum and 
lifetime total of five years or less, depending on the state. Recipients are also required to work 
after receiving aid for two years; though states may require work or community service within 
two months of receiving assistance.117 Retreating federal authority also meant that there now no 
rules mandating a minimum cash allowance for recipients. In fact, there is no federal rule requir-
ing states to provide cash assistance through TANF at all. By 2003, the percent of TANF funds 
spent on cash assistance had fallen to less than 40%.118 With few federal guidelines, states are 
able to spend TANF funds at their discretion as long as the spending is in service of the 
PRWORA objectives: to curb teenage pregnancy, promote heteronormative marriage, encourage 
work in the private sector, and reduce entitlement spending and welfare dependency. 
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Together, the cuts in federal spending and devolution of rulemaking to states, contributed 
to a 63% reduction in AFDC caseloads from 1995 to 2005; from 12.3 million to 4.5 million.119 
State discretion has also allowed states with higher percentages of black residents to provide less 
generous benefits when compared to states with more white residents.120 Finally, evidence has 
shown that TANF beneficiaries have worse outcomes compared to previous AFDC beneficiaries. 
Research reveals that TANF recipients earn only 87 percent of the poverty line after ending ben-
efits; whereas, AFDC recipients earned 111 percent of the poverty line. The study’s authors con-
clude that the workfare and time limit provisions of the TANF program compel people into low-
er wage work, while the more flexible AFDC programs allows recipients to select from higher 
paying opportunities.121 
The political moment Clinton arrived at in 1996 was not a favorable one. In his first term, 
Clinton failed to overhaul the healthcare system and after the 1994 midterm elections, he was 
forced to contend with a majority Republican Congress. Gingrich’s Conservative Coalition tar-
geted social programs immediately. Gingrich led the attack on welfare by promoting the belief 
that illegitimate births were the primary cause of government dependency.122 Lawmakers openly 
stated that the goal of PRWORA was to stigmatize aid and make single-parenthood more diffi-
cult.123 One Georgia legislator even asserted that the punitive measures for welfare recipients 
were in fact kindly when compared to more extreme proposals, such as mandatory steriliza-
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tion.124 The public’s views of welfare were similarly unforgiving. In the mid-nineties, only 31% 
of people believed that welfare recipients who can work try to find jobs.125 By August of 1996, 
Congress had already sought the passage of two welfare reform bills both of which Clinton ve-
toed. Anticipating the Republican’s third attempt, Clinton weighed the advice of his advisers and 
Vice President Al Gore. Strategist Dick Morris warned that a third veto on welfare legislation 
would turn his “fifteen point win into a three point loss”.126 Aware of the potentially disastrous 
effects, Clinton signed PRWORA into law.127  
The Republican Party was not the only important voice in the President’s ear however. At 
the same time that politicians and scholars on the right voiced their support for reform in the 
1980s and 1990s, members of the left were also adopting a more conciliatory view. Political 
commentators like Thomas and Mary Edsall as well as the Democratic Leadership Council, ad-
vised that the Democratic Party ought to distance itself from its close identification with black 
and urban voters in effort to win back white working class voters. One way to do that was to use 
welfare reform as a tool of persuasion.128 Clinton was a prime candidate for this message with 
his record on welfare reform as Governor of Arkansas.129 Through famously vowing to “end 
welfare as we know it” on the campaign trail, Clinton signaled change and accountability to 
white voters and ultimately won them back. Running as a centrist, distancing himself from the 
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black community, and heralding a swift end to welfare enabled Clinton to become the first Dem-
ocratic presidential candidate since 1948 to outpoll his Republican opponent.130  
 To fully understand Clinton’s welfare legacy, it is important not only to discuss the im-
plications of the monumental PRWORA legislation but also the complementary tax reform of the 
era. Ten years removed from PRWORA, Clinton described the Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC) as an integral program in his overarching goal to “make work pay”.131  The EITC works 
by allowing individuals and families to reduce the amount of income tax owed and usually re-
sults in a refund.132 As president, Clinton oversaw the greatest expansion of any social program 
in American history through the EITC. The number of families claiming the EITC grew from 
12.5 million in the beginning of the 1990s to 19.3 million by the end of the decade, surpassing 
both Food Stamps and the new TANF program in size and cost.133 Individuals without children 
also became eligible for the program for the first time and the income range for eligible partici-
pants expanded. In the face of Republican attempts to scale the program back, Clinton defended 
the EITC as the main way people could work themselves off of AFDC and successfully protect-
ed the program.134 It was not immediately clear though that Clinton would choose the EITC as 
his primary anti-poverty policy. 
During Clinton’s first term, there was discussion within his administration whether or not 
to expand the EITC and increase the minimum wage standard. Ultimately, Clinton pursued the 
EITC expansion first in The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (P.L. 103-66). Though 
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Clinton would go on to increase the minimum wage by 90 cents by the end of his first term, he 
ignored the advice of his Secretary of Labor, Robert Reich, who advocated for a stronger meas-
ure. Secretary Reich advised Clinton to index the new minimum wage to inflation, allowing it to 
grow with the rate of inflation. By not doing so, Clinton rendered the new wage standard impo-
tent against inevitable increases in inflation and cost of living.135 Clinton’s administration likely 
considered other factors before putting their full weight behind the expansion of the EITC.  
Christopher Howard, a Professor of Government at the College of William and Mary, of-
fers a few reasons for the growth of the EITC program. Howard points out that EITC increases 
have historically passed in periods of divided government and are attractive for both parties to 
appeal to low-income voters. Howard also highlights that the EITC expansions in 1990 and 1993 
were both part of omnibus budget acts, providing supporters with more points of leverage than a 
standalone bill.136 The most salient lesson for welfare reformers however is that EITC advocates 
worked hard to distance the program from any association with welfare. This distance allowed 
members of both parties to embrace the tax credit under the guise of reform- not welfare spend-
ing. 
To preempt any association with the loaded issue of welfare, proponents framed the EITC 
as the opposite of traditional welfare.137 In addition, instead of targeting aid at non-working 
adults, they focused on working families.138 The EITC is said to incentivize people to move off 
of welfare by rewarding their work and this “reward for work” tagline has resulted in bipartisan 
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support for the program since its inception in 1975.139 By promoting work, EITC supporters also 
believe that the tax benefit supports families, unlike direct assistance which invites untoward and 
nefarious behavior. Finally, EITC advocates claim that the program is easier to administer than 
long standing welfare programs because the EITC is part and parcel of the existing federal tax 
structure.140 Although the EITC has enjoyed broad acceptance from both political parties, there 
are many skeptics of the program who decry its elevated status in American social policy.  
 Professor of Law at Yale University, Anne Alstott, criticizes the inflated stature of the 
EITC. Alstott argues that the EITC falls far short of its anti-poverty goals impacting the official 
poverty status of only 3.5 million adults and 1 million families.141 She argues against the narrow 
workforce goals of the program and calls for welfare reforms that increase individuals’ wellbeing 
and participation in society.142 Alstott further criticizes the low-standard of “making work pay” 
and calls on renewed action for social programs which adequately raise the standard of living 
and mobilize more people out of poverty.143 Others argue that while the EITC program helps the 
working poor, it does not do enough to get the non-working poor, working again. Unlike work-
fare requirements which mandate labor market participation, the EITC does not efficiently moti-





139 Howard, The Welfare State Nobody Knows, 105-106.; Alstott, "The Earned Income Tax Credit and the 
Limitations,” 533.  
140 Alstott, "The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations,” 533. 
141 Alstott, Anne L. "Why the EITC Doesn't Make Work Pay." Law and Contemporary Problems 73, no. 1 
(2010): 296.  
142 Alstott, “Why the EITC Doesn't Make Work Pay,” 297.  
143 Alstott, “Why the EITC Doesn't Make Work Pay,” 312-3. 
144 Lawrence Mead, “Overselling the Earned Income Tax Credit." National Affairs. 2017. Accessed De-






 Answering the question of how the Democratic Party lost the battle over welfare requires 
a close examination of both the Party and its electorate for the entire span of the 20th century. 
Such a broad view unearths the many missed opportunities to create a comprehensive welfare 
system and the entrenched racism among the American populace which stymied equal policy and 
opportunity for all people. Through this analysis of three Democratic presidents, the emergence 
of a more centrist and conservative party, capable of undoing its own legislative achievements 
comes into focus. This discussion begins with President Roosevelt, known universally as the cre-
ator of the American welfare state, but also in part responsible for its many shortfalls.  
 President Roosevelt inherited the worst financial recession the country had ever known 
when he entered office in 1933. In response to the unemployment crisis, he created numerous 
public works programs putting millions of Americans back to work. Roosevelt also oversaw the 
enactment of the first federally administered direct assistance program, through Title V of the 
Social Security Act, Aid to Dependent Children. The shadow cast on his welfare legacy lay not 
in the enormous problem he received or in his immediate handling of the economic disaster, but 
in his inability to seize the moment to create a lasting federal jobs program or racially equitable 
social service system. Members of Roosevelt’s inner circle like Harry Hopkins urged him to 
promote full employment legislation. Congress’s resistance towards granting greater federal 
rights also inhibited progress. By not setting the precedent for federal intervention through a sus-
tained jobs program in the early 20th century, Johnson had little precedent to build from when 
great need arose again. 
 Roosevelt’s tepid approach towards racial equality would also come back to hurt the 





first days of the ADC, Roosevelt created an expectation for accommodation among Southern 
Democrats who sought the continued exploitation of  African-American low-wage labor. Roose-
velt’s National Recovery Act also bolstered unions which had a long history of discriminating 
against blacks.145 By looking the other way at discriminatory union practices, Roosevelt gave his 
silent affirmation. Racism and apathy among local union members persisted through the 1960s 
when local labor union support for Great Society reforms was noticeably mute. Roosevelt’s am-
bivalence towards the race question ultimately undermined the egalitarian democracy he sought 
to strengthen. President Johnson would carry on to confront the issue of poverty with an anemic 
class consciousness that did not unite the races. 
 After President Kennedy’s assassination, the American people gave President Johnson 
mandate to lead in his landslide victory in 1964. Johnson used the momentum to oversee sweep-
ing civil rights laws and enter into a full-scale war in Vietnam. Domestic issues came to the fore 
shortly after his election as well, in the form of race riots and mounting economic frustration 
among blacks. A white backlash resulted as whites increasingly saw the War on Poverty as too 
myopically focused on urban or black issues. As mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the 
Democratic Party was also without a key ally for their economic platform, as support from local 
unions was near non-existent. Johnson’s inability to quell rioting and provide blacks with mean-
ingful opportunities as well as his inability to persuade whites of the Great Society’s continued 
importance severely eroded his ability to lead.  
Towards the end of his tenure, Johnson was increasingly forced to reckon and account for 
the mounting human and financial costs of war. Though public opinion consistently favored the 
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anti-communist war efforts, by 1967 support for escalation had reached its peak.146 And within 
his own party, liberals were threatening to cut off Great Society aid if he did not end the war.147 
Towards the end of his life Johnson reflected on Vietnam: “that bitch of a war on the other side 
of the world” “killed the woman I really loved- the Great Society”.148 Although the Vietnam War 
is not entirely responsible for the shortfalls of Johnson’s domestic goals, it did draw away mil-
lions if not billions in resources and alienated members of his own party who would have other-
wise aligned with Johnson’s civil rights and economic agenda.149 If Johnson had truly wanted to 
extend the legacy of the New Deal programs, he might have listened more closely to his domes-
tic advisers who called for a more sweeping restructuring of the Manpower program, higher tax-
es for expanded domestic funding, and a public jobs programs.150 To this point, due to the inac-
tion of the Roosevelt administration, Johnson had little precedent from which to launch a federal 
jobs program. 
Although Johnson had accomplished a great deal towards alleviating poverty, including 
barring discrimination in the workplace and housing, increasing AFDC aid, and creating the 
Head Start program, Republicans framed these programs as symptomatic of a more endemic is-
sue within poor (coded black) America. In particular, Republicans seized on the massive spike in 
AFDC rolls as a clear indication that Democratic Party policies had run afoul. Democrats were 
criticized for promoting dependence, a trait that is considered antithetical to American virtue. 
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Fueled by the great promise and failure of the Great Society to combat poverty and then by the 
stagflation endured during President Carter’s tenure, by the 1980s the Republican Party was 
ready to shape the national discourse. It also had a new leader, the “Great Communicator”, to 
convey its message, Ronald Reagan. 
President Reagan’s ascension to the White House set in motion a backlash against big 
government and a steady retrenchment of social programs. With the backing of politically mobi-
lized Evangelical Christians, the Republican Party convinced America that it was the moral party 
and with this moral high ground they sought to discredit social spending, especially on welfare. 
By the 1980s, most of America had also already begun to associate the GOP as the stronger party 
on the economy. Leveraging his party’s moral and economic legitimacy, Reagan cut AFDC, 
Food Stamps, and Medicaid to their lowest levels since the 1930s. Reagan also leveraged a more 
insidious element within his party, a propensity for racism. 
After the War on Poverty was waged, in the minds of many Americans blacks came to 
symbolize the failure of big government intervention. Worse still, African-Americans were per-
ceived as lazy and therefore undeserving of hard-earned taxpayer dollars.151 Instead of putting 
this stereotype to bed, Reagan capitalized on it to maximize his assault on entitlements. By label-
ing the fraudulent criminal Linda Taylor as a “welfare queen”, Reagan created an association 
between all black women and welfare fraud. The weight of Reagan’s remark is not quantifiable 
but it goes without saying that the president’s words affect the consciousness of a nation. Un-
doubtedly, Reagan’s use of “welfare queen” reinforced negative assumptions about welfare’s 
corrosive impact and African Americans’ supposed abuse of the system, creating a pernicious 
stereotype for black women and heads of households especially. 
 





White voters’ enchantment with President Reagan became the envy of the Democrat Par-
ty. His new legion of “Reagan Democrats” fueled a faction within the Democratic Party who 
sought a renewed alliance with white working class voters. This “New Democrat” coalition took 
a cue from Reagan’s playbook and embraced white voters to the exclusion of everyone else by 
playing down entitlement spending and promoting business interests.152 Their most successful 
political product was future President Bill Clinton who distanced himself from typical liberals 
and pledged to put to an end to welfare.  
Entering the White House in 1992, Clinton had promises to fulfill. He characterized him-
self as a New Democrat, nothing like the previous generations of tax and spend liberals. Clinton 
sought and won tougher punishments for crime, deregulation of banks, and a complete overhaul 
of the welfare system. His breed of politics reflected the public mood of the day which was more 
trusting of conservative approaches to the economy and deeply skeptical about direct cash trans-
fers like AFDC.153 With the policy groundwork laid before him by Reagan and the intense pres-
sures from Republicans in Congress to sign a welfare reform bill, Clinton calculated the political 
exigencies. Ultimately, with just three months before the election, he made good on his cam-
paign promise and signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
into law. The impact of the law was swift and dramatic; AFDC, now TANF, caseloads fell by 
over 50 percent in the span of less than a decade. Workfare requirements and time restrictions 
also forced recipients, largely women, into the low-wage economy at the expense of potentially 
higher wage work. 
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At the same time that Clinton contemplated welfare reform for the stigmatized AFDC 
program, he was at work expanding the EITC. Under Clinton, the EITC grew more than under 
any other president, surpassing both TANF and Food Stamps in its size and cost. The underlying 
philosophy behind the EITC is that the program incentivizes and rewards work. Yet, the extent to 
which these claims are true and whether the costs outweigh benefits of the program are inconclu-
sive. What is clear is that the EITC  has been embraced by both parties for over four decades. On 
top of this, surveys show the public also broadly supports the EITC.154 For a Democrat like Clin-
ton, who erred on the side of fiscal conservatism and centrism, expanding the EITC was an easy 
choice. However, for the poor and especially the non-working poor, the EITC alone cannot lift 
people out of poverty. The EITC may mitigate the burdens of poverty, but it does not do enough 
to reduce the overall rates of poverty and it does not do enough to raise the overall standard of 
living.155  
Three main obstacles emerge when examining the development and retrenchment of the 
welfare system through the perspective of the Democratic Party: lack of party unity, ineffective 
messaging, and a nonexistent federal employment strategy. These issues have undermined the 
presidencies of Roosevelt, Johnson, and Clinton resulting in the persistent economic degradation 
of working class and unemployed Americans. They hinder the party’s ability to alleviate poverty 
and enact an effective welfare strategy.  
Achieving party unity eluded the Democratic Party since Roosevelt’s administration due 
to opposition from Southern Democrats who fought to preserve their low-wage black labor. The 
Southern faction continued to dog Johnson’s White House when their reluctance towards War on 
Poverty spending ended in permanent divisions and defections to the GOP. During the Great So-
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ciety period, the Party also lost a key ally in organized labor, making it that much harder for 
Congress to drum up support within the public. Underlying the racially charged divisions of the 
early 20th century and the ideological disputes of the 1990s was the Democrat’s inability to cul-
tivate a strong class consciousness in their voters. By failing to unite voters on the basis of class 
concerns, the Party was vulnerable to racial divisions and the appeal of neoliberalism. Com-
pounding the Democrat’s problems at achieving party unity was their ineffectual messaging. 
Along with failing to create a convincing class narrative, the Democratic Party missed 
numerous other opportunities to control the message. Beginning with the Great Society, some 
scholars maintain that Johnson’s grandiose promise to eradicate poverty was itself problematic. 
By imposing lofty expectations on his domestic agenda, it was only logical that all expectations 
would not be met, leaving the public frustrated. The lesson learned was to aim for incremental 
goals and thereby keep the public’s trust. Secondly, in response to the riots which ravaged cities 
during the latter half of the 1960s, Johnson offered no satisfactory response. Further hastening 
the white backlash against his Great Society was the perception among whites that the domestic 
spending was too narrowly aimed at inner cities. By failing to counter this perception or con-
vince whites of the spending’s effectiveness, the legitimacy of the War on Poverty waned.  
Again during the stagflation of the 1970s, Democrats struggled to explain the phenome-
non when they could have pointed to the diminished wage growth for average Americans. By 
falling silent in the 1970s, they effectively handed the Republicans a microphone for their attack 
on government spending.156 In response to Reagan’s rhetoric, the party was also conspicuously 
silent. Afraid to alienate middle class voters, Democrats offered no vigorous defense of the social 
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programs for the poor which Reagan’s budget cuts targeted.157 Seeing the political advantages of 
following in Reagan’s footsteps, Clinton mimicked Reagan’s draconian position on welfare re-
form on the campaign trail. Thereafter as President, Clinton was taken to task on his promises by 
the Republican Congress. 
Finally, consistent among all three presidents was their lack of initiative to bring about a 
federal public jobs program. For Roosevelt, his enlightenment and embrace of workers rights 
came too late in his presidency. Although he outlined the citizen’s “right to a job” in his “Eco-
nomic Bill of Rights” address, he was not able to see it through nor was his New Deal coalition 
in Congress who pursued the Full Employment Act in 1946. Johnson was similarly reluctant in 
his leadership, preferring to keep states in control of their employment strategies. What jobs 
Johnson sought to bring to the inner-cities were poorly funded and designed, and may have elic-
ited more resentment and negative publicity than positive outcomes. Finally, Clinton’s attempts 
to buoy the workforce came through indirect, half measures. The mandatory workfare require-
ments of PRWORA legislation compelled people into low-wage jobs and the incentives within 
the EITC have done little to remediate the root causes of poverty or joblessness.  
To create a more just, proactive, and efficient welfare state, the Democratic Party must 
pursue a federal employment strategy. This policy must guarantee citizens the “right to a job” 
promised by President Roosevelt nearly a century ago. Employment opportunities must also be 
made available to all Americans to preempt any perception of bias which the War on Poverty 
suffered from.158 It must also be implemented incrementally to sidestep accusations of unfulfilled 
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promises. If pursued strategically and conveyed with effective messaging and the full support of 
the Party, a public jobs program could become the new cornerstone of American social policy. 
 
Conclusion 
To enact a comprehensive and effective anti-poverty strategy, the Democratic Party must 
search outside of the confines of traditionally popular policies like the EITC or workfare welfare 
reform. They must return to the early platform outlined by President Roosevelt and create a fed-
eral job guarantee. The Party must also consider complementary social programs for which an 
extensive body of literature already exists: paid family leave, expanded child-care subsidies, and 
reforms in unemployment and disability insurance.159 By providing people with the social ser-
vices they need to successfully navigate the workforce and care for their families, these programs 
would produce an equitable and upwardly mobile society. To move forward with any hope of 
reviving the American welfare state, the Democratic Party must look inward and reflect on past 
failures. This process begins with turning historical weaknesses into strengths and addressing 























Two centuries ago, the French sociologist Alexis de Tocqueville observed a nascent na-
tion, the United States of America, with an air of admiration. Tocqueville was particularly im-
pressed by the country’s esteem for property rights and high level of civic engagement. Writing 
in Democracy in America in 1835, Tocqueville saw the two foundations of democratic society as 
inextricably linked, “The government of democracy brings the notion of political rights to the 
level of the humblest citizens, just as the dissemination of wealth brings the notion of property 
within the reach of all the members of the community; and I confess that, to my mind, this is one 
of its greatest advantages”.160 In a society where feudal ties never existed, property rights for av-
erage, predominantly white citizens, became a binding agent of community ethos. The right to 
own property encouraged New Englanders to take part in civic life because they were personally 
invested in the outcomes of town decisions. Fast forward two hundred years to the 21st century, 
social scientists continue to observe the positive financial and civic impacts of property owner-
ship, particularly homeownership. The present dilemma for modern America is how to make the 
advantages of homeownership available to all Americans.  
The goal of homeownership is foundational to the American Dream. However, since the 
1970s the rate of Americans achieving homeownership has remained flat at around 64%.161  Ex-
amining this 64% figure reveals a fuller picture of how homeownership rates are strongly corre-
lated with income level: for households earning or exceeding the median income in 2020, 78.8% 
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owned a home, for households below the median income only 51.8% owned a home.162 Though 
the rate of low-income homeownership has increased by nearly 4 percentage points over the past 
forty years, it lags far behind the 78.8% rate of middle and upper income earners. This is prob-
lematic because home assets are a key element of upward mobility. And for the majority of 
Americans, specifically lower and middle income earners, homes represent their largest asset. In 
2013, homes comprised 44% of middle income households’ wealth and 48% of lower income 
households’ wealth.163 Homeownership is therefore the single greatest means of building wealth 
and financial security for the majority of Americans.  
Wealth accumulation occurs through homeownership in a variety of ways. For instance, 
homes typically appreciate over time and grow in value. Additionally, homeowners can leverage 
the equity in their home to pay for improvements, children’s education, to start a small business, 
or deal with an emergency.164 Using home equity in this way is considered “cultivating” or grow-
ing more wealth and further stabilizing one’s household.  In addition, housing wealth serves as a 
“protector” by insulating owners from the costs of inflation over time, given that most mortgages 
have fixed-rate terms.165 The benefits of paying a mortgage versus paying rent add up over time, 
with the average net worth of a homeowner totalling $195,400 compared to the average net 
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worth of a renter, $5,400; a figure 36 times as large.166 Homeownership therefore remains the 
largest and most viable means for building wealth in the United States. 
While the financial advantages of homeownership are well-documented, owning a home 
also carries enormous financial risks. In general, homeowners encounter unexpected mainte-
nance costs and the risks of foreclosure and eviction. With foreclosure, homeowners may experi-
ence the loss of other assets and long-term damage to their credit. It is important to account for 
these risks in the context of low-income homeowners especially, as low-income households in-
cur the highest levels of risk. Low-income owners are more likely to pay a greater portion of 
their household income in housing costs and they are more likely to be subject to predatory or 
volatile lending products, both of which correlate to higher rates of foreclosure.167 Homeowner-
ship only remains an advantageous financial strategy if households can weather financial down-
turns and see the long-term gains on their investments.168  
In spite of the risks inherent in homeownership, owning a home remains the foremost 
lever for increasing household wealth for the vast majority of Americans. The question that now 
remains is, how can the country increase the rates of homeownership for those at the lowest rung 
of the income ladder, particularly people of color, who are most in need of cultivating wealth? If 
more proactive measures to turn renters into homeowners are not taken, intergenerational pov-
erty will persist. And if the history of racial discrimination in the housing market is not ad-
dressed, the black-white wealth gap only runs the risk of worsening.  
 
166 Matthew Desmond, “How Homeownership Became the Engine of American Inequality.” The New York 
Times, May 9, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/09/magazine/how-homeownership-became-the-engine-of-
american-inequality.html. 
167 Rebecca M. Blank, Michael S. Barr, Raphael Bostic, and Kwan Ok Lee, “Homeownership: America’s 
Dream?” In Insufficient Funds: Savings, Assets, Credit, and Banking among Low-Income Households. New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation, 2009, 14 & 28.  
168 Laurie S. Goodman and Christopher Mayer, “Homeownership and the American Dream.” Journal of 





For the reasons stated above, it is imperative that the federal government take new steps 
to grow household wealth for all Americans. The federal government can do this by taking two 
first steps. First, the government must further reform the mortgage interest tax deduction (MID), 
a policy which inflates housing costs and does little to incentivize new homeowners. Reforming 
the MID could bring in tens of billions of dollars in new revenue each year to fund existing and 
start new programs to support first-time homeowners.  
Secondly, the federal government needs to rethink its approach to the Section 8 Housing 
Choice Voucher (HCV) program. The temporary housing goals of the HCV program are under-
mined by inefficiencies, challenges to find willing landlords, inflated or unaffordable housing 
costs, and little evidence of upward mobility gains for participants. Instead of providing medio-
cre temporary housing support, the government should do more to help turn prospective families 
into homeowners. This would require expanding the Section 8 Home Ownership Program and 
creating more robust housing counseling and savings programs nationwide. Taken together, 
these reforms could provide a permanent housing solution, build wealth, and create secure finan-




In the review of the literature on federal housing policy, specifically subsidized housing 
and the mortgage interest tax deduction, there are two fairly demarcated camps: progressives and 
conservatives. This is to be expected in a discussion of major spending programs and one of the 
largest tax deductions in the tax code. In general, conservatives criticize the housing assistance 
programs as costly while progressives call for expanding assistance. There are decisive disa-
greements on the issue of the MID as well, with conservatives seeking to protect its stance in the 






Conservative School of Thought 
Many conservatives call for limited federal government intervention into housing policy 
and limited taxation on personal property. Conservatives defend the mortgage interest tax deduc-
tion as an “integral part of a tax-neutral system”, keeping borrowers and lenders on an equal 
playing field. On top of this tax-neutrality, proponents of the MID argue it spurs investment 
which creates job and wage growth.169 Conservatives do not view the MID as a subsidy to 
homeowners but as an intervention which creates symmetry between lenders and borrowers, one 
which would not be necessary if lenders were not taxed for their gains on interest revenue in the 
first place.170 
Conservatives further criticize federal housing allowance programs as an entitlement 
which is inefficient and creates dependency. They cite increasing lengths of stay among program 
participants and overhousing within rental units as indicators of growing government depend-
ence and inefficient economic spending.171 On the issue of privatization of government housing 
programs, conservative views are more nuanced however.  
While privatization of government programs is often considered a laudable conservative 
goal, this is not the case with the privatization of housing policy. Some conservatives criticize 
the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) as enabling corporate welfare. The Heritage 
Foundation argues that the program does more to enrich private investors than mitigate the hous-
ing crisis, citing research which finds that only 35% of the 8 billion dollar LIHTC translates to 
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decreased rent burdens.172 They argue that the LIHTC creates unfair competition within the pri-
vate market by disincentivizing the creation of completely private, unsubsidized units which 
might otherwise be produced.173  
Progressive School of Thought 
 Unlike conservatives, progressive policy makers believe in direct federal intervention in 
housing policy. The answer to what form that direct federal aid should take varies widely. Some 
reformers promote expanding down payment assistance and housing counseling programs to 
raise homeownership rates, while others take issue with the idea of homeownership as a goal in 
and of itself. Still others believe in expanding existing programs like the HCV, to create a kind of 
Universal Housing Voucher. 
 Jenny Schuetz, of the Brookings Institution, dismisses the fixation on homeownership as 
a goal for all Americans, arguing that more aid should be directed to renters. Schuetz points to 
the overall demographic trends in the declining homeownership rates and the recent millennial 
trend of waiting later in life to start families and buy homes as reasons to refocus attention on 
helping renters. She highlights the barriers that people of color face in engaging with the housing 
market as well, from discrimination in the home-buying process to the disproportionately nega-
tive impact of the 2009 housing crisis experienced by people of color.174 
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 Affordable rental housing advocates propose that the federal and state governments 
should revise zoning regulations to promote more multi-family housing development.175 To bring 
new housing developments to life, the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) is frequently 
championed with bipartisan support.176 The LIHTC is currently the largest federal subsidy pro-
gram for creating new rental housing units, having produced 47,511 properties and over 3.13 
million rental units from the year of inception in 1987 through 2017.177 Advocates contend the 
LIHTC incentivizes private business interest in what would be otherwise financially untenable 
projects for private investors alone.178 
Other progressives promote the expansion of the Housing Choice Voucher program, 
which is currently the largest direct federal intervention program serving over 2 million house-
holds.179 Given the fact that housing vouchers are not an entitlement program however, like 
Medicaid or Medicare, millions across the country remain on waiting lists. In fact, three in four 
eligible families do not receive any housing assistance.180 And waiting lists can last years or dec-
ades.181 Some lists are even closed indefinitely, as is the case in Washington D.C.182  
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In order to achieve the goal of safe rental housing, new legislation banning “source of in-
come” discrimination in housing is being touted and even enacted in states like California. This 
kind of law bans landlords from rejecting potential tenants based on their source of income. The 
goal of this nondiscrimination law is to improve the effectiveness of HCV programming and re-
duce potential racial or class discrimination in the rental search process.183  
Finally, some progressive reformers want to expand the definition of who should receive 
federal subsidies. In addition to federal intervention for low-income households, they call for 
more subsidies for middle-income households. By removing the MID and local property tax de-
ductions, this new federal revenue would pay for expanded down payment assistance programs. 
One such program is the American Dream Downpayment Initiative, which currently only serves 
households making less than 80% of the local Adjusted Median Income (AMI).184  
Attracting middle-income households through housing subsidies can generate a wider and 
more reliable property tax-base for a city, may enhance the social capital and networks within 
neighborhoods, and encourage those with stable employment to become home-owners in lower-
income neighborhoods.185 However, potential drawbacks include the possibility of displacing 
lower-income households, disincentivizing labor market mobility by tying one’s occupation to 
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The Black-White Homeownership Gap 
Within the progressive school of thought, it is vital as well to focus on the black-white 
homeownership gap. Many researchers have found that federal government policies have had a 
disproportionately negative impact on people of color. From the institution of slavery and the 
unfulfilled promises of the Freedman’s Bureau to the subprime mortgage loan crisis in 2009 and 
still ongoing redlining tactics, African-Americans continue to face discriminatory obstacles in 
the homebuying crisis.187 The result is a vast racial gap in homeownership, with lowest rates of 
all racial groups experienced by African-Americans at 41 percent. This number stands in stark 
contrast to the rate of white homeownership, who own at a rate 71 percent; a gap that has tripled 
from 8 percentage points in 1900 to 26 percentage points in 2016.188  
Sociologists Melvin Oliver and Thomas Shapiro trace the racist beginnings of the Federal 
Housing Authority (FHA) in 1934 when the agency created advisory maps for loan officers. The 
Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) maps designated racially-mixed and all-black neigh-
borhoods as undesirable, with the net result being many fewer loans made available to these 
neighborhoods. Fewer loans translated into fewer black home-owners and a dearth of home im-
provement funds to improve the housing quality in black and brown neighborhoods.189 The fed-
eral government’s advocacy of whites-only neighborhood covenants and racist allocation of GI 
benefits after World War II also contributed to lower rates of black homeownership.190 
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In present day, FHA-era redlining tactics still undermine the ability for people of color to 
buy homes in certain areas. The Center for Investigative Reporting (CIR) revealed in 2018 that 
modern day redlining persisted in 61 U.S. cities, with the highest concentration in Southern cit-
ies. Controlling for nine social and economic factors in their analysis, CIR found that people of 
color were significantly more likely to be denied a home loan compared to their white counter-
parts.191 In spite of federal regulations and in some cases with the direct aid or complicity of the 
federal government, African-Americans and other communities of color face undue burdens in 
the homeownership process. 
 
Gaps in the Literature 
Within the existing literature on federal housing policy, there are many compelling argu-
ments to be found on both sides of the ideological debate. Within the conservative camp, there is 
reason to investigate inefficiencies in the nation’s largest and longest standing approach to subsi-
dized housing. It is possible that the HCV program has over the past fifty years become bureau-
cratized and stagnant, resulting in increased costs and length of participant stays but unable to 
meet the lofty aims of upward social mobility envisioned at its inception. To that end, it is im-
portant to question the very goals of subsidized rental housing advocates. Of course providing 
temporary shelter is a necessary government intervention for people in crisis and members of 
society unable or interested in becoming homeowners. But there is mixed, if not underwhelming 
research supporting the continuation of the nation’s largest subsidized housing program. There-
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fore, it is vital to consider alternative housing solutions, to provide not only temporary shelter but 




Housing Voucher Program Findings 
 
Since the Nixon administration, the federal government has devolved its authority over 
affordable housing to local municipalities, creating the project and tenant-based housing vouch-
ers programs which predominate housing assistance today. In the 2019 budget year, the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) spent $11,876,929 billion on Project-Based 
Housing Assistance (PBRA) and $22,899,472 billion on Tenant-Based Rental Assistance 
(TBRA).192 PBRA provides low-income residents with housing tied to a specific housing unit 
and the TBRA provides low-income residents with a Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher which 
tenants can use to shop for housing on the free rental market. For a combined total of 
$34,776,401 billion dollars, these two programs provide housing to 3.5 million families with the 
largest portion, 2.3 million households served by vouchers.  
Under general eligibility requirements, family income may not exceed 50% of the median 
income for the metropolitan area and tenants must pay 30% of their income towards rental 
costs.193 All assistance is administered through residents’ local housing authority, while HUD 
determines the ceiling on rental payments based on calculations of local Fair Market Rent or 
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Small Area Fair Market Rent. Additionally, landlords must comply with rules of HCV admin-
istration and as noted earlier, there is no federal law requiring landlords to accept HCVs. 
Turning our focus to Housing Choice Vouchers, in the early years of the program liberal 
advocates argued that the vouchers empowered families to maximize their housing and move to 
areas of better opportunity. Pro-voucher reformers promoted the idea of deconcentrating the poor 
and enabling poor families to experience the same social capital and public infrastructure that 
their middle-class neighbors enjoyed.194 The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment’s research on the HCV program finds that participants experience reduced rates of home-
lessness, crowding, independent living situations, increased expenditures on food.195 Voucher 
recipients were also more likely to move out of their baseline Census tract indicating greater mo-
bility; however, overall quality of housing did not improve compared to the control group.196  
  More recent research on the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) program has also re-
vealed potential positive outcomes for children of voucher recipients although the MTO program 
represents a fraction of HCV program participants. In brief, the MTO program provides HCVs to 
participants with the requirement that the vouchers are used in areas with poverty rates below 10 
percent. Five local housing authorities participated in the 10 year MTO demonstration, beginning 
in 1994, with 4,604 families participating. Previous research has found MTO participation had 
no positive effect on adults’ income, yet children under the age of 13 who participated in the 
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MTO experienced greater annual earnings as adults than their control group peers.197 What this 
reveals is that for young children, moving to lower poverty areas has positive income effects lat-
er in life.  
It is clear that HCV programs provide temporary housing, reduce homelessness rates, al-
leviate household costs, and that children who are able to move into lower poverty areas reap 
income benefits later in life. However, the majority of voucher leavers do not enjoy the upward 
mobility initially idealized at the program’s outset. Additionally, though research is limited on 
the experience of people after they exit housing assistance programs, what evidence is available 
raises questions about the benefits and long-term impact of these programs. In 2014, the Urban 
Institute analyzed the experience of 1,142 MTO program participants who had recently exited 
the HCV program. In brief, the MTO program provided HCV holders with housing counseling to 
help low-income families move into low-poverty areas. Urban Institute researchers grouped 
housing assistance “leavers” into two groups: positive leavers (52%) and negative leavers (48%). 
The study took place two years after participants left the MTO program.  
Researchers found that participants who left the assistance program for positive reasons 
such as marriage or income gains, reported a median income of $37,865 while leavers who left 
the program for negative reasons such as lease violations, eviction, or inability to find an apart-
ment reported a median income of $13,950.198 Even the positive leavers who reported an income 
advantage of $23,915 over negative leavers, still earned $15,792 less than the U.S. median in-
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come in 2014 ($53,657).199 Of the 52% who left the MTO program on positive terms, many had 
purchased homes in the period since. However, in qualitative interviews they revealed economic 
vulnerabilities such as: struggling to make payments on interest-only loans, home purchases in 
depreciating neighborhoods, and difficulties affording food or utility payments.200  
Other early critics of the HCV program viewed vouchers as a retrenchment of the federal 
government and a means of “throwing the poor back onto the tender mercies of the private land-
lord”. Still others feared that private rental prices would become inflated with the introduction of 
housing vouchers.201 Both concerns rest on the new power dynamic emerging. Instead of HCV 
holders dealing with a theoretically accountable federal government, now renters had compara-
tively little leverage with which to lodge their complaints against private landlords. Recent re-
search has borne out many of these privatization concerns.  
In a 2016 analysis of HCV holders, Matthew Desmond and Kristin Perkins observed this 
overcharging phenomenon in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Desmond and Perkins found that voucher 
households were charged between $51 to $68 more per month than unassisted households. In 
total, the overcharging of HCV holders amounted to $3.8 million dollars.202 Additional research 
has shown that raising the rent ceiling uniformly for HCVs in an attempt to allow HCV holders 
access to more-expensive and theoretically higher- quality housing did not have the intended ef-
fect. Raising HCV ceiling limits was found to have no positive impact on housing unit or neigh-
borhood quality, but did result in higher rental prices for the neighborhood.203  
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Another issue related to the privatization of public housing is the ability of landlords to 
decline to accept vouchers. Recent studies have found that private landlords will not accept HCV 
holders due to numerous factors: mandatory income requirements, racial and social stigmas, in-
spections, and local housing authority bureaucracy.204 Although laws banning source of income 
discrimination have shown marked increases in HCV acceptance rates, since there is no federal 
law in most cities and states, it remains legal for landlords not to accept voucher holders.205  
A final leading issue related to the privatization of public housing is that HCV holders are 
frequently priced out of highly-sought after neighborhoods, relegating them to higher-poverty 
areas.206 In an effort to provide HCV holders with access to higher quality neighborhoods, HUD 
started the Small Area Fair Market Rent (SAFMR) program which determines voucher amounts 
based on private rental costs according to the more localized measure of zip codes within a Fair 
Market Rent area. In its first report on the efficacy of the SAFMR program, HUD studied 7 of 
the 24 participating local housing authorities (LHAs). It found that in all seven of the LHAs, 
SAFMRs increased voucher holders’ access to higher opportunities neighborhoods.207  
Returning to conservative criticism of federal housing policy, discussed previously in the 
literature review, many argue that assistance is not an efficient investment and invites moral haz-
ard. Specifically, critics argue that vouchers distort housing decisions by prohibiting voucher 
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holders from living with others, outside of the family members on their voucher.208 Howard 
Husock, of the Manhattan Institute, cites that 15% of public housing recipients and 20% of HCV 
holders are “overhoused”, meaning their apartments have empty bedrooms.209  
Conservatives also highlight overspending for subsidized housing as another example of 
inefficiency. They argue that cash payments in lieu of rent payments have shown that when as-
sistance recipients are given the freedom to choose how to spend their money, they spend more 
efficiently than the government. In a 1970s HUD Experimental Housing Allowance Program, 
participants were given cash payments instead of rent payments; in turn, tenants chose to spend 
less on housing costs and repairs compared to the default program, leading to the conclusion that 
subsidy levels could be reduced without injuring tenant well-being.210 Another inefficiency cited 
is the administrative cost of the HCV program, calculated annually at $840 per household.211  
Finally, conservative critics also cite the increasing length of stay in subsidized housing 
as an indication of increasing government dependence. A 2016 HUD report found that the aver-
age length of stay for all groups receiving housing assistance increased since a 2009 report: with 
the length of stay for HCV holders increasing from 7.5 years to 9.1 years and the length of stay 
for project-based tenants increasing from 6 years to 10 years.212 
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Mortgage Interest Tax Deduction Findings 
 
The mortgage interest tax deduction allows homeowners who itemize their taxes to re-
duce their tax liability by deducting the interest paid on their mortgage payments. The MID has 
been a part of the U.S. tax code since the Revenue Act of 1913. However, it became increasingly 
coveted by the National Association of Realtors (NAR) in the 1980s when the NAR began lob-
bying politicians with lines such as: “Don‘t let Congress eliminate your mortgage interest deduc-
tion. Keep the American Dream alive.” Although over ⅔ of Americans did not benefit from the 
tax deduction at the time, the MID gained political traction. In 1984, President Reagan directed 
his Treasury Department to “preserve that part of the American dream which the home mortgage 
interest deduction symbolizes.” 213 In the decades since, the MID’s stance in the tax code has be-
come increasingly unassailable, championed by the right and conspicuously overlooked by the 
left. It is considered the equivalent of “electrified apple pie” in Americana parlance, yet contin-
ues to benefit only the top tier of American society.214  
After the exemption on contributions to pension funds, the mortgage interest tax deduc-
tion is the second largest federal government expenditure on behalf of individuals.215  
At present, the U.S. Treasury Department estimates that the MID will reduce federal revenue by 
$597.6 billion from 2019-2028 or approximately $60 billion each year.216 However, most middle 
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and low-income earners do not benefit from the MID because they do not itemize their taxes, 
opting for the standard deduction instead.217  
Even before the Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017, which reduced the allowable loan princi-
pal amount from $1 million to $750,000, only 21 percent of households claimed the mortgage 
interest tax deduction.218 Of the 21 percent of households claiming the deduction in 2018, less 
than 4% of taxpayers earned $50,000 or less. And of that 4% of lower income earners, they re-
ceived only 1% of the deduction’s overall benefits. This means people who earn more than 
$200,000 receive the greatest advantage from the MID, accounting for up to 34% of the claims 
and obtaining 60% of the MID’s benefits.219  
Effectively, the MID serves to lower the interest rate paid by homeowners. For instance, 
“a taxpayer in the 26% bracket who is paying a 5% percent nominal interest rate experiences an 
actual interest rate of 3.7 percent” and the homeowners disproportionately benefitting are higher-
income earners in the higher income tax brackets.220 The MID is by its very construction de-
signed to benefit wealthy taxpayers over lower-income taxpayers and the missed revenue streams 
annually present a substantial missed opportunity for the federal government.   
 
 
Black-White Homeownership Gap Findings 
 
There are significant racial disparities and inequities to consider when assessing the rates 
and risks of homeownership in the United States. In 2019, the black-white homeownership gap 
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was at its highest level in over 50 years; a difference of over 30 percentage points. And in 2017, 
black homeownership was at its lowest level in the past half century, at 41.8%; the lowest of all 
racial and ethnic groups.221 On top of the fact that black households experience the lowest rates 
of homeownership, they also experience the greatest risks entering the housing market.  
In fact, controlling for income, foreclosure rates increase in communities where there are 
higher populations of African-Americans.222 And black and Hispanic applicants are more likely 
than white applicants to be denied home loan applications. In 2015, the rate of black applicant 
denials was nearly three times the rate of white denials, amounting to a rejection rate of 27.4% 
for black applicants and 11% for white applicants.223  
Minority and low-income borrowers represent the demographic groups least likely to 
weather financial downturns as well.224 During the 2008 financial crisis, black and Latino home-
owners were nearly twice as likely to foreclose as white homeowners; 8% compared to 4.5%.225 
And in the years since the Great Recession, black homeowners have been unable to make up the 
ground lost when compared to white homeowners; totaling a loss of 770,000 black homeowners 
from 2001.226 Further research finds that between 2004-2016, both black and white homeowner-
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ship rates declined. But the rate of decline for white homeowners was 5%, compared to 16% for 
black homeowners.227 These figures highlight the racial gaps in homeownership and the linger-
ing effects of the most recent economic downturn. The declining rates of black homeownership 
are especially troubling given the link between homeownership and wealth. 
According to a 2018 Urban Institute study which examined the impact of parents’ home-
ownership on children’s homeownership between 1995-2015, there are significant advantages in 
having a home owning parent for children’s prospects of homeownership and wealth accumula-
tion. The report found that having a home owning parent increased a child’s likelihood of be-
coming a homeowner by 7-8 percentage points. The study also highlighted the stark realities im-
pacting black parents’ homeownership: as 71.5% of white parents sustained homeownership, 
while only 31.4% of black parents were able to sustain their homeownership.228 The black-white 
wealth gap represents a blight on the nation and an anchor holding back the financial stability of 
African-American families; as of 2016, the average white family’s net worth totaled $171,000 
while the average black family’s net worth totaled $17,150.229 Among other structural economic 
factors, the black-white homeownership gap continues to have a pernicious impact on the wealth 
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Housing Choice Voucher Program Discussion 
 
The question under review is how the federal government’s present housing policy serves 
the goal of increasing low-income homeownership. The federal government’s largest interven-
tion for providing housing and largest expenditure is the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher 
Program. This program’s goal is not to bolster homeownership, but instead to assist “very low-
income families, the elderly, and the disabled to afford decent, safe, and sanitary housing in the 
private market”.230 The program’s goals are then explicitly temporary and while beneficial for 
participants during their program tenure; overwhelmingly housing assistance leavers cannot 
boast long-term advantages.  
Even the slim majority of HCV holders who exit the program for positive reasons report-
ed struggles to make payments on high-interest or interest-only subprime loans.231 This in and of 
itself should not come as a surprise given that the majority of subprime loans are made to low-
income borrowers, a disproportionate number of which are African-American, indicating limita-
tions in accessing fair credit opportunities or racist practices in the lending process.232 What can 
be gleaned from this data is that even “positive leavers” of the HCV program face significant 
hardships in navigating post-housing assistance life. This reality is compounded by larger struc-
tural forces of discriminatory lending and redlining practices. 
Upon exploration of HCV holders’ experiences as tenants, the challenges facing program 
participants are wide-ranging. From difficulties of affording housing due to inflated rental costs 
 
230 “Housing Choice Vouchers Fact Sheet.” U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.  
231 Smith et al., 21.  
232 Allen Fishbein and Harold Bruce, “Subprime Market Growth and Predatory Lending.” The Department 






in highly concentrated-subsidized housing areas, to struggles to afford housing in desirable, low-
poverty neighborhoods due to grossly calculated voucher rent ceilings, to a lack of protection 
from source of income discrimination due to limited legal protections, HCV holders face a mi-
asma of problems when seeking rental housing- let alone attempting to maximize their voucher 
by moving to neighborhoods of greater opportunity.  
The inefficiencies within the project-based and tenant-based housing programs are cause 
for concern as well. These inefficiencies range from: overcharging on rental units, discouraging 
cohabitation, administrative costs, and increasing length of stays in both programs. The case 
overcharging in the city of Milwaukee alone represented an overpayment of $3.8 million dollars 
annually; this same sum of money could be used to house an additional 620 families. Milwaukee 
is just one of hundreds of municipalities across the country administering the HCV program, so 
the true impact of landlord overcharging is unknown but undoubtedly an enormous figure.  
The issue of increasing length of stays for project and tenant-based housing participants 
also calls into question what the goals of housing assistance are and are these goals ambitious 
enough? The research shows that the length of stays for both programs are increasing and the 
rent prices in one’s immediate rental housing market is correlated with length of stay. If a renter 
is confronted by higher rent prices in the rental market, they are more likely to remain in assisted 
housing.233 Should the federal government continue to subsidize renting in tight rental markets 
when the research above indicates that the existence of the subsidy itself drives up rental prices? 
Is there another solution possible other than increasing the duration of stay, to the benefit of the 
700,000 landlords who take part in the program, but to the detriment of families who are in no 
better position to acquire housing assets and therefore wealth, than before entering the program? 
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Mortgage Interest Tax Deduction Discussion 
 
The mortgage interest tax deduction is a frequent target of tax reformers because, as dis-
cussed above, its benefits are overwhelmingly weighted towards the upper class. Although laud-
ed as a part and parcel of the American Dream and a justified tax-neutral deduction by conserva-
tives, in fact, there is little evidence that the MID promotes first-time homeownership. For in-
stance, many of America’s peer countries do not have a mortgage interest tax deduction yet they 
have higher rates of overall homeownership: Britain, New Zealand, Canada, Australia, Singa-
pore.234 Notwithstanding other variables supporting homeownership in those countries, in the 
U.S., the MID does little to encourage homeownership because it is overwhelmingly utilized by 
the wealthy who are likely to purchase homes regardless of tax incentives.  
In a perversion of the progressive nature of the tax code, the MID is utilized by the na-
tion’s highest-earners.235 At the end of the day, the deduction is considered less of an incentive to 
become a homeowner and more of an encouragement for maximizing mortgage debt. That is, 
even in spite of the recent 2017 tax reforms capping maximum loans, the MID may still motivate 
individuals to take out larger mortgages or even purchase second homes.236 The MID in effect 
incentivizes construction of expansive, single family homes and vacation homes and does not 
serve to attract or convert potential first-time homeowners. The wealthy taxpayers who itemize 
their taxes should not be subsidized by lower wage earners who do merit government aid. 
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In a discussion of how to increase low-income homeownership through reforming the 
MID, it is useful to put in perspective the untapped revenues generated by the MID. The approx-
imate annual missed revenue of the MID is $60 billion a year; a figure which could pay for three 
years of the HCV program or triple the current number of families utilizing the program from 2.3 
million to 6.9 million. However, the goal is not to expand current subsidized housing programs, 
but rather increase the rates of homeownership. This could be accomplished in a myriad of ways 
by redistributing MID revenue towards first-time homeownership programs. 
 
Black-White Homeownership Gap Discussion 
 
The particular vulnerabilities affecting the comparably lower rates of homeownership for 
people of color must be recognized and remedied. Since the first public housing projects were 
created, they were segregated and implicit and explicit racism in the real estate and lending in-
dustries have stymied homeownership rates for African-Americans.237 The unbroken practice of 
mortgage redlining, disproportionately higher rates of foreclosure, and predatory lending practic-
es impacting African-Americans compared to their white counterparts cannot be ignored and 
must be addressed with aggressive public policy.  
To counter the impact of decades-long discrimination that African-Americans have expe-
rienced in the housing market, it is critical to tailor policies specifically to African-American 
communities. Since people of color are less likely to weather economic downturns and less likely 
to keep their homes for the loan’s lifetime; generating less family wealth for future generations, 
new policies should be focused on mitigating the financial precarity facing first-time buyers.  
 





For instance, since black homeowners have historically put less money down when pur-
chasing homes compared to other racial groups,238 resulting in larger principal amounts and 
higher monthly mortgage payments, the federal government could provide more down payment 
assistance. Although previously, it was believed that foreclosure rates were higher for buyers 
who received such assistance, more recent research has shown that government grant recipients 
are at no greater risk of foreclosure than buyers who do not receive similar government aid.239  
Beyond providing more targeted aid to potential first-time African-American homeown-
ers and curb the recent trend of declining mortgage loan applicants,240 the federal government 
should do more bolster enforcement of the Fair Housing Act to put an end to ongoing discrimina-
tion and segregation. The Obama Administration sought to enhance enforcement of the Fair 
Housing Act in 2015 under the “affirmative furthering” rule which required municipalities re-
ceiving federal aid to assess the state of housing segregation and create a remediation plan.241 
Since that time however, the Trump Administration, has reversed the “affirmative furthering” 
rule, severely limiting enforcement of the Fair Housing Act’s anti-discrimination and integration 
goals.242 It is imperative that Congress make the “affirmative furthering” rule into law so that 
enforcement is not subject to the whim of the executive branch. 
African-American communities could also benefit from more robust housing and credit 
counseling. According to lenders, the reason most frequently cited for denying black home loan 
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applicants is credit history.243 By offering housing and credit counseling, African-American po-
tential homebuyers would have stronger applications and greater likelihood of receiving mort-
gage loans.244 Counseling could also provide information on savings plans and downpayment 
assistance programs. Beyond these recommendations, black homeowners could benefit from 
many other initiatives within a revised federal policy; a policy more focused on permanent hous-
ing solutions and growing family wealth. 
 
Conclusion 
 To increase low-income homeownership from the current rate of 51%, the federal gov-
ernment must rethink its approach to its largest subsidized housing program, the Section 8 Hous-
ing Choice Voucher and significantly reform the mortgage interest tax deduction. This will re-
quire prioritizing permanent housing solutions over temporary housing solutions and a much 
more proactive position of the federal government; meaning an end to the devolution of federal 
authority begun under the Nixon Administration. This will also require revising the MID which 
currently aids upper-income home purchases while delivering few benefits to middle and low 
income earners. Let us first consider potential reforms to the mortgage interest tax deduction.  
 The goal of reforming the mortgage interest tax deduction is to increase the rates of low-
er-income first-time homeowners. This can be achieved by limiting the mortgage loan maximum 
amount, currently $750,000, to a number more in line with the annual national median home 
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price, currently $327,000.245 The MID could also be limited to a household’s first home, exclud-
ing vacation homes. Both of these reforms would result in billions of dollars in new tax revenue 
each year which could be redistributed to promote low-income homeownership.  
Another more nuanced proposal from economists Edward L. Glaeser and Joseph 
Gyourko caps the MID at $300,000. But the plan lifts the $300,000 cap on all counties except the 
36 which have inelastic housing markets. Some of the 36 inelastic housing markets include: 
Montgomery County, Maryland, Orange County, California, and Nassau County, New York to 
name a few. From there, because these markets have both high housing prices and low levels of 
new construction, the proposal would repurpose all of the tax revenue generated towards produc-
tion of new housing.246 The authors do not stipulate that the new housing construction be di-
rected towards affordable housing units, but to promote the goals of both racial and class integra-
tion, this would need to be stipulated for broader societal gains.  
 Moving on to reforms to the Housing Choice Voucher program, in order to shift the pro-
gram’s goals to homeownership instead of exclusively rental housing, the existing Section 8 
Housing Choice Voucher Home Ownership (HCVHO) program needs to be substantially im-
proved and expanded. The HCVHO program works similarly to the HCV program, but instead of 
providing rental assistance it makes monthly mortgage payments on behalf of program partici-
pants. Like the HCV program, the HCVHO program is administered by local housing authorities 
(LHA) and it is up to the LHA to choose to participate in the program. Currently, there are also 
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no down payment assistance funding provisions included in the HCVHO program, which may 
severely limit the program’s accessibility for potential applicants.247   
The current lack of down payment assistance funding and the fact that LHAs may choose 
to opt in or not highlights the federal ambivalence towards low-income homeownership and the 
lack of vital leadership. Before expanding the existing HCVHO program, it will be important to 
investigate best practices in the LHAs with high rates of participation, study the impediments for 
LHAs who choose not to participate, and understand the challenges in program administration.  
Finally, to increase the rates of low-income homeownership it is necessary to increase the 
level of household savings. Putting more money down when purchasing a home reduces monthly 
mortgage payments, reduces the overall cost of the loan, and insulates buyers from future eco-
nomic downturns. By expanding the existing Individual Development Account (IDA) program, 
which typically provides $2 in matching funds for every $1 of participant contributions, the fed-
eral government could support many more Americans in saving for a downpayment. In the peri-
od of 1998-2010, federal IDAs helped 6,000 households purchase a home.248 Investing signifi-
cantly and more widely marketing IDAs could vastly increase the rate of homeownership. Since 
many low-income homebuyers report struggling to fund necessary home repairs, in addition to 
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creating IDAs for down payment purposes, it will be important to partition some of these funds 
for ongoing home maintenance and repairs.249 
By reforming the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program and mortgage interest tax 
deduction, the federal government can support all Americans achieve homeownership. Owning a 
home should not come with 50/50 odds for low-income people because owning a home is the 
single greatest means for acquiring wealth in this country. We need to do better to increase the 
rate of homeownership and bolster the wealth and financial security of the most economically 
vulnerable. Policy shifts like those described above would lead to more intergenerational wealth 
for low-income families, particularly for people of color who disproportionately hold the lowest 
levels of assets and intergenerational wealth transfer. This is achievable through expanding exist-
ing policies like the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Home Ownership program, increasing 
housing and credit counseling, down payment assistance and Individual Development Account 
savings programs, and by substantially limiting and redistributing mortgage interest tax deduc-
tion revenue. In order to create a more equitable and prosperous country, our government pro-
grams and tax code must serve as levers of social mobility and help all Americans achieve the 













Chapter 3: Building Wealth: The Promise of Individual Development Accounts 
Introduction 
 
 Occupy Wall Street protesters’ encampments in 2011 demanding an end to income ine-
quality, boarded up buildings left to decay as vestiges of the 2009 foreclosure crisis, and more 
recently Black Lives Matter activists coalescing in both rural and city streets across the nation 
calling for racial justice -- these images illustrate the depth of the unrest and social and economic 
suffering felt by millions of Americans. Over the past decade, the issue of income inequality has 
come to the fore in the country’s political consciousness and the same can be said increasingly 
for the related issue of racial justice. In fact, the majority of all Americans believe that there is 
too much income inequality in the United States and over two-thirds of Americans have ex-
pressed support for the Black Lives Matter movement.250 People are asking for change because 
income, wealth, and racial inequality persist; class gaps have been widening since the 1970s and 
racial disparities have been endemic to the nation’s founding, buoyed by government policies 
along the way.  
With regard to income inequality, in 2018, the top twenty percent of Americans earned 
half of the nation’s income in that year alone.251 And economic trends are moving in the wrong 
direction; in 2019 U.S. income equality reached its greatest heights in five decades.252 Racial 
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disparities reveal that the median black household earns less than two-thirds compared to the 
median white household annually. Put another way, in 2018 the median white household earned 
$84,600 compared to $51,600 for black households.253 What is even more alarming than the ra-
cial income gap, however, is the widening racial wealth gap. 
In 2016, the median white household’s wealth totaled nearly $149,703 while the median 
middle-class black household had $13,024 in wealth. This means that the typical white family 
has assets over eleven times as large as their peer black household. And the wealth disparities far 
eclipse the income disparities in terms of percentage.254 Much like the overall wealth gaps which 
have been widening for over a half century, the racial wealth gap has grown as well. For in-
stance, in 1968 the median black household was worth $6,674 in wealth compared with $70,786 
for the median white household, a figure roughly 10 times as large. These figures show that 
black households are in a worse financial position than they were fifty years ago. What this all 
means is that economic mobility is not guaranteed for all races equally and shared economic 
progress will not happen on its own.  
To ensure economic security for all Americans, new targeted approaches to addressing 
both the income and wealth gaps must be taken. This requires a policy shift away from “treating” 
poverty in a symptomatic approach to “solving” poverty by remediating its source. Instead of 
relying on an array of housing and cash subsidies like the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher or 
TANF payments which provide temporary relief, a long-term approach to alleviating poverty and 
promoting social mobility is necessary. This requires investing in asset-based welfare policies 
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which aim to put low-income people in positions to own assets which will build their household 
wealth over time. As discussed in the introductory chapter, social mobility in the U.S. has stalled, 
especially for people of color. It’s time to adopt full scale approaches to lifting millions out of 
poverty and to do so in a way that empowers people to save and then spend on assets that match 
their needs and interests.  
Building upon the existing infrastructure of Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) for 
incentivized low-income savings is the most expedient and efficient course of action. But this 
alone will not be enough; to redress income and wealth inequality, individuals need more money 
to save in the first place. Therefore, to enable individuals to save at higher rates, the federal min-
imum wage must also be increased to a higher living and savings standard.   
 
Individual Development Account Background 
Individual development accounts are matched savings accounts which allow participants 
to save and spend on long-term assets like homes, higher education, and small businesses. Partic-
ipant eligibility, financial counseling services, allowable assets, and deposit matching level are 
determined by the program administrator (non-profits, state agencies, tribal organizations, banks 
or credit unions). Participant eligibility is capped at a certain income level, often 200 percent of 
the federal poverty level or $25,520 for an individual or $52,400 for a family of four.255 There 
are also limits on household net worth, usually around $10,000. Financial counseling is also pro-
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vided and in most cases mandated for the majority of IDA participants. Finally, deposits are most 
commonly matched at a 1:1 or 1:2 rate.256    
Since their creation in the early 1990s, IDAs were first adopted by individual states 
through state appropriated funding. Under President Bill Clinton’s (D) Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA) of 1996 (P.L. 104-193), IDAs received their first federal 
funding. The legislation allowed states to use appropriate Temporary Assistance to Needy Fami-
lies (TANF) funds for IDAs. Subsequently in 1998, Congress passed the Assets for Independ-
ence (AFI) Act which provided matching funds to states for IDA demonstration projects. The 
AFI mandated that non-federal funds match all federal funds with a cap of $2,000 lifetime feder-
al funds for an individual and $4,000 federal funds for a household.  
More recently in 2016, all of the nearly 20 million of annual AFI funding was cut as part 
of a package of cuts to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.257 Prior to being de-
funded, AFI provided the majority, or nearly two-thirds, of all IDA funding.258 During its entire 
program existence, the AFI spent $267 million resulting in 978 grants and the creation of 
113,975 IDAs. Participants withdrew their matched deposits for 1) higher education (22,703), 
home purchases (17,902), and small business capitalization (14,512).259  As of 2019, in every 
state except Wyoming there is at least one IDA program administrator, however, only ten states 
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and the District of Columbia appropriate their own funding. All other funding for IDAs comes 
from states who choose to allocate TANF funds and private sector sources.260  
The most recent TANF report to Congress was published in 2018 for fiscal year 2015. In 
total, states received $16.5 billion in TANF block grants and 20 states received an additional 
$685 million in Contingency Funds.261 Of this total nearly $18 billion in funding, $1,544,074 
million federal dollars were allocated towards IDA development and match grants. States con-
tributed an additional $23,688, creating a combined total of $1,567,762 in total federal and state 
TANF spending towards welfare recipients’ asset development.262 The latest spending data 
available for FY 2018, shows an increase in both state and federal funding to $223,428 and 
$2,134,026 respectively, combining for a total of $2,357,454.263 This increase in TANF funding 
from 2015 to 2018 may be attributable to the defunding of AFI-sponsored IDAs in 2016.  
In spite of the recent federal cuts to IDA programming, the prevailing research on the ef-
fectiveness of IDA as a savings mechanism for asset development is positive. Yet, support for 
IDAs has begun to split along common political fault lines for aid programs which target the 
poor. Conservatives, once early supporters of IDAs, have cooled on the policy and shifted sup-
port in favor of more income-neutral and less generous universal savings plans while progres-
sives have continued to support the programs, viewing them as one of several government inter-
ventions necessary to uplift the poor.  
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This paper seeks to understand the current and potential effectiveness of IDA programs, 
as part of a broader assets-based welfare strategy inclusive of policies that maintain income and 
increase wages. Specifically, this research is focused on how IDAs boost low-income homeown-
ership and bridge the racial wealth gap by enabling more African-Americans to become home-
owners. The literature review will examine the different ideological positions on IDAs which 
ultimately determine their political viability and livelihood. The findings section will review cur-
rent research on the effectiveness and racial disparities within IDA program participation. Atten-
tion is also given to how increased minimum wage standards could enhance low-income work-
ers’ abilities to save for IDAs and work towards more financial stability. Finally, the discussion 
section offers recommendations for improving and expanding current IDA programs and argues 
for a higher federal minimum wage to improve living and saving standards.  
 
Literature Review 
Individual development accounts, first established in the 1990s, enjoyed early bipartisan 
support. Progressives supported IDAs because of their aim is to raise low-income populations 
into more permanent financial security. Unlike other government aid programs, IDAs garnered 
conservative enthusiasm because of the perceived promotion of a “pro-savings mentality” and 
the potential to reduce dependence on government aid.  
The leader of the asset-based welfare policy movement is Social Policy Professor Mi-
chael Sherraden who created the concept of individual development accounts in the early 1990s. 





which currently dominate the welfare landscape. Sherraden explains that the sole reliance on in-
come-transfer policies has reaped few long term gains for the poor. While acknowledging that 
income-transfers alleviate the deleterious impact of poverty on households, they have done little 
insofar as reducing class or racial divisions, stimulating the economy, engendering public sup-
port, or most fundamentally reducing poverty rates.264 Instead of replacing income-transfer poli-
cies, Sherraden highlights their complementary importance in ensuring short and long-term fi-
nancial stability.265  
Leading scholars in racial wealth inequality research, Thomas Shapiro and Melvin Oli-
ver, also promote the needs for an assets-perspective. Shapiro and Oliver highlight the historical 
discrimination African-Americans have faced in purchasing assets be it through government 
condoned mortgage redlining or unequal access to the post-WWII G.I. Bill.266 The authors sup-
port assets-based policies to remediate the racial wealth gap, like IDAs and also support savings 
accounts that begin early in the life course, like Children’s Savings Accounts.267 Shapiro high-
lights the synergistic relationship between individual and community assets in his supportive ar-
gument, “...the task is to structure and integrate policies that encourage home ownership and the 
kind of civic involvement that demands better schools and neighborhoods.”268 
Progressive think tanks like the Brookings Institution and Urban Institute have also pub-
lished reports in support of IDAs as a vehicle for social mobility. A 2005 Brookings Institution 
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policy brief recommends several methods for increasing IDAs including: greater state appropria-
tions of TANF funds, existing refugee resettlement programs, and more options for taxpayers to 
automatically save upon receiving tax refunds.269 A more recent 2019 Urban Institute analysis of 
AFI participation calls for continued program support. The authors also highlight  that most fed-
eral asset-building expenditures benefit high-income families while government programs used 
by the poor include penalties for savings which creates built-in disincentives.270  
Although asset-based welfare strategies have become more mainstream over the past few 
decades, not all progressives endorse the policy wholeheartedly. Some are concerned that such a 
change in priorities will prematurely divert government resources from income-maintenance 
programs and leave low-income people in an even more precarious position. Other more-left 
leaning progressives call for a more substantial overhaul of the economic system, arguing asset-
based welfare is merely a band-aid on what is fundamentally an unfair construct.  
John Karl Scholz and Ananth Seshadri argue against wealth-building policies in favor of 
policies that build more human capital and bolster existing social insurance policies. They ex-
plain that it is unwise to ask impoverished populations to reduce their consumption in order to 
save more because this is counter to these families’ wellbeing. To that end, the authors criticize 
the efficiency of asset-based policies because they ask people to self-insure against future finan-
cial hardships, when it is more prudent to collectively insure against such hardships through state 
mechanisms.271 Sanford Schram offers another pointed critique of asset-based welfare policy, 
holding that this shift in focus makes it harder to develop public policy which counters market 
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principles where poverty begins in the first place. He holds that the philosophy of “saving the 
poor by making the poor save” results in low-income people getting mired in the “assets 
traps”.272 Schram does identify some hope for asset-based policy by integrating Amartya Sen’s 
“capability framework” and embracing more of the broad-based reforms the United Kingdom 
has, including increased savings incentives and nationwide implementation.273  
As mentioned above, initially conservatives and progressives supported individual devel-
opment accounts and assets-based policy interventions with shared enthusiasm. The second ma-
jor piece of federal legislation, the Asset for Independence Act (AFI) (P.L. 105-285), even col-
lected more Republican co-sponsors than Democrats. Leading conservative think tanks like the 
Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) promoted IDAs for reasons 
ranging from changing the political culture to improving individual’s savings behaviors. Con-
servatives have supported IDA because of their ability to help participants’ “focus on the future 
instead of on instant gratification and consumption” and “change the way a low‐wage worker 
looks at his family, his community, and himself”.274  
However, not all conservatives were early adopters of IDA policies. The Vice President 
of the Cato Institute, David Boaz, criticized Republican Senator Dan Coats’s (R-IN) sponsorship 
of the AFI, citing the legislation as another example of the federal government errantly inserting 
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itself into people’s lives while spending taxpayer money.275 And since the early years of biparti-
san support for IDAs, conservatives have distanced themselves from the program, as evidenced 
by the complete defunding of the AFI under the Republican-controlled Congress in 2016. Over 
the past decade, conservatives have turned in favor of more income-neutral and less restrictive 
Universal Savings Accounts (USAs).  
Universal savings accounts have not been enacted into law yet, but there is a push under-
way for USAs to become a centerpiece of President Donald Trump’s (R) “middle-class tax cut 
2.0”. They differ from IDAs in three major ways: 1) there is no matching feature for deposits, 2) 
there are no minimum income requirements for participants, and 3) there are no restrictions on 
what funds can be used for upon withdrawal. Conservatives contend that USAs can reduce 
wealth inequality, provide millions of Americans with financial security and in turn reduce de-
pendence on government assistance. Similar to their prior endorsement of IDAs, USAs are at-
tractive because, “the entitlement mentality would be replaced with a savings-and-wealth mental-
ity.”276 Without the matching feature to incentive savings, USAs would also be significantly less 
expensive. In addition, by making USAs available to all people irrespective of income, conserva-
tives are able to avoid appearances of providing government handouts to only certain popula-
tions. Over the thirty or so years since the IDAs were established, ideological divisions have be-
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Gaps in the Literature  
The ideological positions and concerns described above are useful starting points for this 
analysis of asset-based welfare policy. What is missing from the literature is how the leading re-
search on IDAs, coupled with research on minimum wage increases, can inform a more inclusive 
asset-based welfare strategy and improve low-income social mobility and racial parity. Less at-
tention will be paid to the leading conservative savings policy of universal savings accounts be-
cause they have yet to be enacted. However, the United Kingdom’s savings plan, Individual Sav-
ings Accounts, will be evaluated as a potential model for expanded IDA programming. The aim 
of this paper is thus to find the potential in each of the different ideological positions and put 
forward a revised approach to assets-based welfare policy capable of remedying the stagnant 
wealth distributions and the black-white wealth gap.  
 
Findings 
Individual Development Account Findings 
 
This section offers a synthesis of leading research on individual development accounts 
with particular attention to their capacity to reduce the racial wealth gap and increase low-
income homeownership. The first major analysis of IDAs comes from a 1998-2002 randomized 
study involving 1,103 participants living at 150 percent below the federal poverty rate in Tulsa, 
Oklahoma, known as the American Dream Demonstration (ADD). Participants were divided into 
either the control group which did not have an IDA or the treatment group who received match-
ing deposits at a 2:1 rate for home purchases. Initial analysis from 2004 found that after three 





cent higher than the control group.277 As a subgroup, African-Americans also experienced statis-
tically significant increases in homeownership rates and overall net worth.278 
However, in a follow up study of participants from 2009, researchers observed that the 
rate of homeownership for the control group caught up to that of the treatment group, wiping out 
the previous finding of increased homeownership rates for IDA participants. The Tulsa IDA also 
had no significant impact on the length of homeownership for the treatment group.279 The re-
searchers offer several caveats for the diminished long-term effect of the Tulsa IDA including: 1) 
the existence of a competing local down payment assistance program which required no match-
ing funds and 2) the Tulsa IDA was one of the first programs nationwide and differs from con-
temporary programs in terms of match rates, maximum allowable matching funds, and program 
duration (three years compared to the more typical five year length).280 The authors also high-
light that the program did not extend across the lifespan as Michael Sherraden advocated early 
on and they encourage further research on the Tulsa program’s impacts on subgroups.281  
Drawing on data from the same American Dream Demonstration study, Grinstein‐Weiss 
et al. analyzed the effect of race on saving for homeownership. Their findings show that com-
pared to white IDA participants, black participants saved smaller amounts and less frequently. 
By the end of the program, black participants’ deposits accumulated $860 less in savings (with 
the 2:1 match included) and deposited 5 of 12 months compared to whites who deposited 6 of 12 
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months.282 The following variables were cited as reasons for the majority of the black-white sav-
ings gap, all of which African-Americans experienced a lower incidence of: married status, car 
ownership, savings account holding, and monthly savings target. These findings compare with 
more recent federal data on disparities in usage of mainstream financial services which show that 
14 percent of black adults are unbanked compared to 4 percent of white adults.283 To bridge the 
black-white savings gap, Grinstein-Weiss et al. advised more childcare and transportation ser-
vices for single parents, increasing matched rates and monthly savings targets, improving access 
to financial services and more relationship building between employers and IDA administrators 
to increase the rate of direct deposits.284 
Further research from the American Dream Demonstration, reveals a positive relationship 
between IDA participation and the prevention of foreclosure. The 2011 study compared IDA 
homeowners from 1999-2007 with a comparison sample of low-income homeowners. Of the 803 
IDA homebuyers, 25 had entered foreclosure by April of 2009 at a rate of 3.1 percent. In com-
parison to control groups, the IDA foreclosure rate was between one-third to one-half less repre-
senting a statistically significant decrease in risk.285 In addition, the report found that IDA home-
owners were more likely to obtain loans with better terms including more government-insured 
mortgages as compared to conventional mortgages. For instance, 40 percent of IDA participants 
received government backed loans compared to 15 percent of homeowners in the control 
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group.286 The authors suggest IDA participants’ acquisition of better loan terms and avoidance of 
foreclosure is consistent with their hypothesis that IDA program design yields better preparation 
for and decision-making within the housing market. They conclude that further research is neces-
sary to mete out how the different factors of program design (matched savings, homebuyer and 
financial education) influence participants’ outcomes.287  
 Since the American Dream Demonstration study, research has been undertaken at sites 
funded by the Assets for Independence Act (AFI) of 1998. One such study was undertaken at an 
IDA site in the Midwest which ran from 1999 to 2007. The treatment group consisted of 164 past 
program participants, divided further between program graduates and dropouts. The control 
group consisted of 136 respondents from the same income tract (at or below 200 percent of the 
federal poverty level).288 Researchers found that program graduates reported higher levels of sav-
ings than both program dropouts and the general population, noting that IDA programs may in-
fluence participants’ savings attitudes and behaviors.289 Other important findings from the study 
noted: 1) the positive impact of opening and maintaining a savings account on future savings, 2) 
the participant’s previous psychological disposition with respect to self-reported ability to deal 
with financial strain and to envision the future, and 3) the presence of children in a household as 
a motivating savings factor.290  
Another study from 2019 analyzed IDA outcomes from two AFI funded sites in Albu-
querque and Los Angeles. The two locations’ IDA program designs both included maximum 
matching grants up to $1,000, however, the Albuquerque site offered a 4:1 match compared to 
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$2.5:1 at the Los Angeles site. In addition, due to challenges obtaining mandated  federal match-
ing funds, the Los Angeles site was unable to match deposits halfway through the third year of 
the program.291 The study found that IDA participants as a whole did not show statistically sig-
nificant increases in homeownership rates. However, an analysis of renters as a subgroup found 
that IDA participation yielded an increase of 4.7 percentage points over the control group. A re-
view of the two locations separately shows that renters at the Albuquerque site increased their 
homeownership by 63 percent.292 In addition to these findings, the report concluded that IDA 
participants experienced increased financial well-being, reduced material hardship, and improved 
access to mainstream banking services.293  
Although the favored conservative policy of universal savings accounts has yet to be en-
acted in the U.S., the United Kingdom has offered a similar savings plan to its residents since 
1999 and this may serve as a useful example to learn from. In brief, the U.K. offers three main 
types of savings plans called: Individual Savings Accounts (ISAs). All ISA contributions can be 
used for any purpose and no income tax is paid on savings or capital gains tax on ISA invest-
ments. The most popular Adult ISA is available to anyone over age 18, regardless of income, 
with annual contribution maximums of £20,000, or $24,678.294 As of 2017, there were over 21.2 
million Adult ISA subscribers, meaning nearly 40 percent of eligible U.K. residents hold an 
Adult ISA. Additionally, the median income of participants fell between £10,000-£19,999 or 
$12,362 - $24,722. The average ISA savings amount for the median subscriber was £24,035 or 
$29,711. The size of ISA holdings increased with income and participation in ISAs is also asso-
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ciated with advancement in age. Although the lowest number of ISA accounts is found in the 
youngest age category (under 25), 83 percent of this group were considered active partici-
pants.295 The popular U.K. ISA savings model may provide insights into creating universal sav-
ings accounts or reforming existing individual development accounts.   
 
Federal Minimum Wage Findings 
 
In addition to studying how IDAs may increase rates of low-income and African-
American homeownership and later wealth accumulation and social mobility, it is important to 
consider how raising the federal minimum wage might work in conjunction to meet these ends. 
Currently, the federal minimum wage stands at $7.25 an hour. It has not changed since 2009 and 
it has never been indexed to inflation. This means that by 2018, the $7.25 wage standard is worth 
14.9 percent less than it was in 2009 due to positive inflation, leaving low-income workers with 
less purchasing power. In fact, the minimum wage peaked in terms of purchasing power in 1968. 
If the same standard were employed today, the federal minimum wage would be worth $10.18 in 
2018 dollars, or 28.6 percent more than its current rate .296 Additionally, there are seven states 
where there is no minimum wage law or with standards lower than the federal level. In these 
states, predominantly located in the south, the federal minimum wage applies.297 In total, over 
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2.5 million people earn the federal minimum wage and contrary to common misconception, less 
than half of these workers fall between the ages of 16-24.298  
The majority of American workers, or around 60 percent, earn more per hour than the 
federal minimum. As of May 2020, twenty-nine states have adopted higher wage standards than 
the federal minimum and 46 localities have adopted a higher standard than their state minimum. 
In 18 of these states and the District of Columbia, the minimum wage is adjusted for inflation 
and mandates to index the minimum wage have been enacted in six additional states.299 Though 
the majority of Americans earn above the minimum wage, another 20.6 million people are con-
sidered “near minimum wage” workers. This means that they earn above the minimum standard 
but less than $10.10 an hour and would benefit from an across the board increase.300 Raising the 
minimum wage would most significantly impact people of color as Latinos and African-
Americans are disproportionately employed in minimum wage or low- wage sectors. 
As described above, 21 states maintain the federal minimum wage. These states also have 
some of the highest African-American populations in the country; some of which are: Alabama, 
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Tennessee. Raising the federal minimum 
wage would therefore have an outsized impact on the African-Americans population.301 Beyond 
increasing the federal minimum wage and indexing it to inflation, over the past decade, more re-
search has been undertaken to understand the effects of the $15 “living wage”. 
A 2015 report from the National Law Employment Project (NELP) found that although 
African Americans make up nearly 12 percent of the total workforce, they account for 15 percent 
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of the sub-$15 wage workforce.302 By adopting a new federal standard of $15, over half of the 
black workforce would experience an increase in wages.303 According to 2016 U.S. Census pro-
jections, several industries which disproportionately employ women and people of color at below 
$15 an hour are also projected to experience some of the highest job growth over the next dec-
ade. Two of these jobs are personal care workers and home health aides; black women are dis-
proportionately represented among home health aides and Latino and African-American women 
comprise equal shares of personal care aides.304 Projections for the 2018-2028 period show that 
these fields are the 1st and 4th largest growing occupations in the U.S.305 They are also the two-
lowest paid jobs on this list, with median salaries in 2018 of $24,200 per year for home health 
aids and $24,020 for personal care aides.306 Both of these median salaries fall below the federal 
poverty threshold of $25,100 for a family of four.307  
Moving on to how increasing the minimum wage might impact workers both positively 
and negatively, a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report from July 2019 analyzed the poten-
tial impacts of three different wage increases: $10, $12, and $15. The report concluded that a 
gradually implemented $15 minimum wage could boost the earnings of 17 million workers. 
Families living under or 1-3 times above the poverty line would experience boosts in household 
income up to 5.3 percent, with the poorest families experiencing the greatest increases. And fam-
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ilies higher on the income distribution, living more than six times above the poverty line would 
experience an annual loss of $700 or .03 percent. In total, by 2025 when the new minimum 
would be finally phased in, 1.3 million fewer people would live below the poverty threshold.308 It 
is also possible that 10 million workers who currently earn above $15 per hour would see in-
creases in their wages as well as employers seek to reestablish a differential wage standard be-
tween their company and minimum wage sectors or if union bargaining agreements are standard-
ized according to the federal minimum wage.309 However, the analysis also estimated a median 
number of 1.3 million people could potentially lose their jobs in response to a $15 minimum 
wage mandate.310 
The CBO cites numerous variables which account for uncertainty in their projected esti-
mates. For instance, they explain that predicting future wage growth is not possible, meaning 
forecasting higher minimum wage standards’ impacts on employment figures is inherently im-
perfect. If say wages increase more quickly than the CBO currently projects, then the employ-
ment impact of a higher minimum wage will likely decrease. And the same is true for the oppo-
site scenario. These projections assume that employment rates are responsive to increases in the 
minimum wage to begin with, which is the second determining variable the CBO cites. Because 
current research on the minimum wages’ impact on employment figures vary so widely, it is dif-
ficult to project the impact on employment with a high degree of certainty.311 
As stated above, leading research on the minimum wage’s potential impacts on employ-
ment offers conflicting conclusions. A 2019 study from the University of California at Berkeley 
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concluded that increased minimum wages increased worker wages and reduced poverty rates 
among households and children. The researchers did not find that higher wage laws had any ad-
verse effect on employment rates or hours.312 In contrast to these findings, a study from the Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research on the minimum wage increases in Seattle, Washington 
found significant negative effects on employment hours. In total, they found that the city’s wage 
ordinance caused low-wage workers’ hours to decline by 9.4 percent during the three quarters 
when the wage was raised to $13, totaling a loss of 3.5 million hours per calendar year. The re-
searchers surmised that the workers’ net wage increase of 3.1 percent did not outweigh the lost 
income caused by reductions in workers’ hours.313 
 
Discussion 
Individual Development Account Discussion 
To increase the efficacy and expand the use of IDAs as a vehicle for asset development, 
particularly low-income homeownership, numerous steps must be taken at the federal level. 
These steps include program-level changes to IDA administration based on best practices and 
known challenges in the life-cycle of a homeowner to macro-level shifts in the federal minimum 
wage. Reforms of this variety and magnitude will create a more equitable savings playing field 
for lower-income individuals and minorities. To begin, we will discuss recommendations for im-
proving IDAs then move onto a discussion of broader economic reforms.  
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Based on the findings above, it is clear that investing in asset-building through IDAs pro-
vides one viable solution for increasing financial security and social mobility for low-income 
households. IDA program participation has been shown to increase participants’ savings rates, 
homeownership, and avoidance of foreclosure. They have also been found to increase partici-
pants’ access to mainstream banking services and self-reported financial well-being. Because 
homes represent the most valuable asset most Americans own, it is important to continue to pro-
vide IDAs as a savings instrument for people to use on their path to ownership. To render this 
policy goal a reality, IDA programs could be improved by several research-based recommenda-
tions which fall into three broad categories: 1) improving access to IDAs, 2) improving savings 
participation, 3) improving the home buying process, 4) improving homeownership retention. 
We will begin by discussing how to increase access to IDAs. 
As described earlier, there are several states with limited access to IDAs or no access at 
all, putting millions of low-income households at a severe geographic disadvantage. IDAs could 
be significantly enhanced through revisions to the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) which is 
currently under review and set for a major overhaul. The CRA’s goal is to proactively compel 
banks to invest and provide services to low and moderate income communities and remediate 
discriminatory redlining practices which plagued communities of color for the greater part of the 
20th century.314 Current proposals from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) 
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) seek to give banks clarity on how to 
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achieve the CRA’s goals through a metric-based system.315 Banks can facilitate IDAs and com-
ply with the CRA by providing: matching funds, technical assistance to program administrators, 
a home or business loan to an IDA participant, or financial education classes, among other forms 
of outreach.316 Although the public comment window ended on March 9th, 2020 there is no set 
deadline for reform and so there is still an opportunity to lobby for greater prioritization of IDAs.  
Another way to increase access to IDAs is to establish new mandates for TANF block 
grants. As described above, the current federal and state TANF investments in asset development 
falls below $2.5 million annually for the 1.2 million families receiving TANF assistance nation-
wide.317 Investing less than $3 dollars per family in asset development will not likely yield sig-
nificant outcomes towards the ultimate goal of self-sufficiency. To raise the rates of the now vol-
untary state participation in TANF facilitated IDAs, the federal government should make this a 
mandatory component for receiving block grants.  
Instead of the current system of devolved responsibility, the federal government should 
provide more leadership in helping states to establish IDAs through contacts with nonprofits, 
state agencies, banks and credit unions. In addition, the federal government should take leader-
ship on abolishing state asset limits for TANF recipients. As of 2014, more than half of states 
limited participants’ assets for TANF cash funds from between $1,000-$2,500. However, re-
search shows that reducing asset limits actually decreases administrative costs without driving up 
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caseloads.318  Therefore, ending asset limitations will actually free up more TANF funding for 
more worthwhile endeavors. Moreover, reducing asset limits, specifically vehicle asset limits, 
provides families with more flexibility and capability to save, while actually reducing program 
participation rates.319  
Moving on from increasing access to IDAs, it is equally important to discuss how to im-
prove savings participation once new programs have been established. With concern to home 
purchases specifically, increased IDA savings amounts are critically important as they can lead 
to higher down payment amounts. Research shows that homeowners who place increased down 
payment amounts have a smaller likelihood of entering delinquency or foreclosure on their mort-
gage.320 A few best practices emerge from the research above to inform enhanced savings prac-
tices.  
To facilitate savings logistics, it is crucial to increase rates of direct deposits and establish 
more connections between IDA administrators and low-wage employers. For all low-income 
households, but especially within communities of color, it is necessary to increase access to 
mainstream financial services. And to improve savings participation among African-Americans, 
further recommendations include increasing match rates and monthly savings targets and provid-
ing more childcare and transportation or “wraparound” services. Ensuring there is a steady fund-
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ing stream to actually match participants’ contributions will be essential to the effectiveness and 
reputational integrity of the program as well. The most fundamental shift IDAs need to increase 
participants’ savings rate, especially for people of color, is a realignment of the federal minimum 
wage to living wage standards, a point we will shortly return to in greater depth.  
 With improved savings rates, IDA participants will be in better financial standing to pur-
chase assets like homes which can eventually provide financial security and promote social mo-
bility. To ensure the homebuying process is as informative and efficacious as possible, it is im-
portant to maximize pre-purchase financial education. Under the prior AFI law, all IDA pro-
grams were required to support participants in obtaining the skills and information necessary for 
self-sufficiency. Most often, this programming was offered in the form of financial education 
and asset-specific training.321 Under TANF IDA programs, states may create their own program 
requirements and financial education is not necessarily mandated.  
Therefore, under future revisions to TANF, it is crucial to mandate financial education as 
a component for all IDA participants. The prevailing research to date supports up to 12 hours of 
financial education classes, after which point gains in the amount of money participants saved 
began to plateau.322 Within the financial education classes geared towards homebuyers, it will be 
important to include guidance around selecting low-risk loans, the importance of maximizing 
down payment amounts and early home equity, and more awareness of potential foreclosure and 
depreciation risks. 
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Finally, after the goal of homeownership has been achieved, it is vital that IDA programs 
continue to play a role in ensuring newfound homeownership is maintained. For homeowners of 
color, this will be an especially significant intervention as data from the Great Recession shows 
black and hispanic homeowners were almost twice as likely to lose their homes as white home-
owners.323 While the federal regulatory reforms above will help in this effort, it is important to 
continue IDA program participation for a period of time after purchasing one’s home and possi-
bly over the life course, as IDA creator Michael Sherraden originally imagined.  
Continuing to invest in an IDA after purchasing a home will allow homeowners to set 
aside funds which may be used for future unexpected expenses. After a job loss, the second most 
commonly cited reason for foreclosure is health expenses, and the third most frequently cited 
reason is poor budgeting skills.324 In addition, most homeowners in pre-foreclosure have no 
available savings, credit, or extended family to turn to for additional resources.325 Proactively 
saving could be the lifeline many low-income homeowners need to confront unexpected health 
expenses; although a larger discussion of U.S. health policy is merited here. Post-home purchase 
IDAs could also offset gaps in self-reported poor budgeting skills as the savings infrastructure 
would be in place and continued financial counseling could be administered.  
To implement best practices on a broad scale will require a significant reinvestment into 
IDAs by the federal government. In 2016, complete defunding of the AFI effectively depriori-
tized the goal of asset-building for low-income households. This action by Congress further de-
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volved federal leadership for asset-development programs to states where under TANF block 
grants states received just over $2 million dollars in 2018 and contributed only over $200,000 
more. Recommitting full funding under the AFI will enable states to revise and expand their IDA 
programs to meet the needs of their residents who seek a path towards self-sufficiency. Beyond 
TANF and redistributed AFI funding, a much larger source of funding exists and should be di-
verted towards IDAs and other asset building programs. This source of funding is the mortgage 
interest tax deduction and the nearly $60 billion in annual revenues which could be collected by 
eliminating the MID. The MID currently enjoys bipartisan support so collecting this missed tax 
revenue will require most likely Democratic Party leaders to take on this issue and confront pos-
sible resistance from upper-income beneficiaries.  
It is important now to turn to a brief discussion of the Individual Savings Account pro-
gram that the United Kingdom administers because it may serve as a model for IDA reform and 
expansion. Although ISAs bear stronger resemblance to the U.S. Republican Party’s favored 
program of Universal Savings Accounts than IDAs, studying ISAs can help U.S. policymakers 
understand their high rates of low-income savings participation. As stated above, the largest in-
come group in the U.K. which owns an ISA is low-income, earning between £10,000-£19,999 or 
$12,362 - $24,722 annually. In total, there were 6.5 million subscribers in this income-band for 
the 2016-2017 year. By comparison, in the nearly 20 years of the AFI, the largest federally fund-
ed IDA program, just over 100,000 IDA accounts were opened. This stark contrast leads one to 
ask: what is different about the ISA program implementation or what is different about the low-
income U.K. saver that is enabling such comparatively high savings rates? It is worth noting that 
prior to participation in the Adult ISA program, U.K. children up to the age of 18 may contribute 





would also be a useful line of inquiry. Finally, analyzing ISA participation by racial group and 
investigating any racial disparities that may or may not exist could provide clues as to how to 
mitigate the racial savings gap in the U.S. as well.  
 
Federal Minimum Wage Discussion 
In addition to investing in IDA programs, the federal government must also begin invest-
ing directly in people. An increased federal minimum wage will enable more low-income people 
to save on their own behalf through IDA program participation. With enhanced earnings, lower 
income households will be able to bolster their savings and increase their financial security in the 
short-term and invest in assets, like home purchases, in the long-term. In order to begin this di-
rect investment, the federal minimum wage must be raised from $7.25 to a new living and sav-
ings standard. Whether this standard is adjusted based on regional living costs or raised uniform-
ly to the increasingly publicly favored rate of $15, it should be indexed to inflation to ensure 
long-term relevance and impact.326 
Federal action on the minimum wage will have an outsized positive impact on communi-
ties of color as people of color are much more likely to earn poverty-level wages. In the 21 states 
where the minimum wage still stands at $7.25 but especially in the southern states with the na-
tion’s greatest populations of African-Americans per capita, this new mandate will have an im-
mediate impact. Women of color would benefit in particular from increasing the minimum wage. 
An increase would impact two of the four fastest growing occupations into next decade: home 
health aides and personal care workers. By boosting the current median hourly wage of $12 per 
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hour to $15, half of the workers in these two healthcare occupations would experience an imme-
diate wage increase. And as discussed above, it is also possible that workers earning more than 
$15 would yield a higher salary as employers seek to maintain a wage differential.  
Calling for a higher federal minimum wage and uplifting the income of the low-wage 
workforce is part and parcel of an inclusive assets-based welfare strategy. Income maintenance 
and elevation as well as IDA formation are not mutually exclusive, but mutually beneficial. In-
come growth will enable greater savings towards IDAs and future asset purchases and IDAs will 
provide people with an incentivized savings structure to grow their wages into wealth. Increasing 
people’s income is therefore critical to the success of an IDA program and by treating low-wage 
growth as integral to the assets-based welfare strategy, scholars and politicians on the far left 
who currently look upon IDAs with skepticism should theoretically become receptive to their 
promise of financial security.  
There are of course many unknowns with such a significant raise of the federal minimum 
wage to the necessary living and saving standard. Because the leading research currently offers 
contradictory findings as to what potential outcomes are of increasing wages, it is impossible to 
say conclusively how overall employment rates and hours would be impacted. It is therefore use-
ful to continue to study state level minimum wage increases more to understand best practices 
for implementation. Whatever long-term course of action is ultimately chosen, some immediate 
action must be taken by Congress to raise the minimum wage to make any meaningful progress 









 Where you put your money reflects your priorities. Currently, the federal budget allocates 
around $2 million annually through TANF towards helping low-income families save for future 
financial independence. If you include additional funding from the federal Family Self-
Sufficiency Program, this number increases by $75 million per year.327 Of the $4.4 trillion dollar 
total federal budget, an investment of just over $75 million for low-income household savings 
and wealth attainment barely registers. However, what is more concerning about federal priori-
ties is the comparative investment made in upper-income earners’ savings plans.  
Tax expenditures in the form of deductions, exclusions, and preferences overwhelmingly 
subsidize higher-income earners savings plans. These tax expenditures total 1.4 trillion dollars a 
year and account for an enormous sum of missed revenue; this includes over $100 billion dollars 
a year in subsidies for retirement accounts, like 401ks and IRAs, which low-wage workers bene-
fit from the least. In fact, most tax expenditures benefit higher-income earners. For instance, in 
2018, the top fifth of earners garnered more than 58.8 percent of tax expenditures and within this 
group, the top 1 percent earners obtained 24.1 percent of total tax expenditures. By comparison, 
the bottom fifth of the income distribution enjoyed just 4.3percent of tax expenditures intended 
to incentivize savings.328 These figures further illustrate the government’s preferential treatment 
of policies which serve the rich while ignoring the needs of the poor. Policies which subsidize 
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existing economic advantages do not incentivize new savings as advertised; instead, they rein-
force privilege and make it harder for low-income earners to improve their financial standing.  
To reverse course, lawmakers must radically shift their priorities to provide proportionate 
or greater resources to help low-income households increase their savings and wealth. Based on 
the findings and discussion above, an assets-based welfare policy inclusive of income mainte-
nance policies offers one viable solution. An assets-based approach to reducing the existing class 
and racial wealth gaps requires massively increasing IDAs and matching funding. Expanded IDA 
programs should incorporate best practices and reforms which address the particular challenges 
people of color face in the home ownership process. Though IDAs may be used for several pur-
poses, home ownership remains the most commonly held asset of Americans and is a direct ve-
hicle for building equity and wealth. Therefore, IDAs should continue to be used to promote 
low-income and minority homeownership.  
By advocating for an assets-based policy coupled with elevating the federal minimum 
wage, low-wage households will be able to do more than get by, living paycheck to paycheck. 
No one is served in an economy where nearly a third of Americans would have to borrow to cov-
er a $400 unexpected expense and over one-in-ten people would not be able to cover such ex-
pense at all.329 Beyond the myriad other negative impacts, this kind of economic fragility hinders 
savings abilities. By mandating a higher federal minimum wage, those earning below the current 
standard as well as those earning above it are likely to experience a positive net gain. For people 
of color especially, increasing the minimum wage will have immediate benefits due to the fact 
that black and Latino women make up a disproportionate percentage of the growing low-wage 
 





workforce and black populations are most highly concentrated in states which currently employ 
the federal standard.  
To rectify the income and wealth gaps which inhibit economic equality and mobility, rad-
ical savings and wage reforms must take place. As Sherraden writes, too often programs target-
ing the poor require “demonstration” projects to prove their worth and rarely result in lasting 
change. He points out the underlying class calculations behind lawmakers’ decisions, asking if 
Congress never asked for demonstration projects before subsidizing 401ks, why wait now to im-
plement reforms that subsidize savings for the poor?330 No doubt, class and racial discrimination 
undergird the federal policies which currently disadvantage the poor and black and brown mem-
bers of society. It will take serious leadership in Congress and realignment of priorities towards 
the least wealthy and least powerful in society to make financial security and social mobility a 













Conclusion: Let America Be America Again:  





Who said the free? Not me? 
Surely not me? The millions on relief today? 
The millions shot down when we strike? 
The millions who have nothing for our pay?331 
 
 
“Let America Be America Again”, poet Langston Hughes’s critical assessment of the 
American Dream feels as timely in 2020 as when it was written in 1935 in the middle of the 
Great Depression. In the wake of the COVID 19 pandemic, unemployment rates near Depression 
Era levels but the economic fragility of the nation has been a long time coming and the economic 
divides in our country are as racially marked as they were during the Civil Rights era. The mil-
lions who have nothing for their pay who Hughes describes here are the millions of modern 
Americans who earn minimum wage and near minimum wage salaries with few benefits and ap-
preciable assets to show for it. The egalitarian promise of equal opportunity remains therefore as 
elusive today as it did in 1935, as it did in 1865, as it did in 1776. Numerous factors contribute to 
the racialized and hierarchical nature of American society and the federal government’s welfare 
and housing policies rank high among them. This thesis portfolio attempts to situate current inef-
fective policies within their proper historical context and presents recommendations to rectify 
past racial discrimination and reification of class privilege with the goal of creating a fairer eco-
nomic system for all.  
The country’s welfare policies since the early days of mother’s pensions have been 
plagued by tepid commitment, weak federal leadership, and racism. Devolution of federal au-
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thority to states to administer President Roosevelt’s Social Security Act of 1935 led to the crea-
tion of racist criteria for benefits or outright exclusion of black dominated occupations. President 
Johnson’s War on Poverty was similarly undermined by southern Democrats’ alienation and de-
fection, alarmed by the War on Poverty’s focus on urban renewal and subsequent race riots. In an 
attempt to localize employment strategy, Johnson resigned federal authority to the private sector 
promising tax deductions for job creation, to little effect and further disillusionment of the black 
community. With the southern Democrats defection to the Republican Party in full swing, Presi-
dent Reagan gained support and a ready audience for his assault on entitlement programs and not 
so veiled attacks on women of color through the characterization of “welfare queens”. Running 
as a moderate Democrat or “New Democrat”, President Clinton took up Reagan’s rhetorical 
mantle and promised “to end welfare as we know it”, again submitting federal leadership to the 
states and creating new obstacles for participation. 
These four presidential case studies reveal a woefully inadequate federal response to the 
needs of Americans and a Democratic Party forced or willing to capitulate to the overt and latent 
racism which pervaded the party and its constituencies for the better part of the 20th century. In-
stead of pursuing an aggressive national jobs strategy when progressive voices within their cabi-
nets beckoned, Roosevelt and Johnson turned to the states. Left to their own devices, state gov-
ernments implemented discriminatory policies or offered menial jobs instead of real opportunity. 
Since Reagan’s ascendency, the Democratic Party has failed to combat the Republican Party’s 
denigration of welfare participants or make social mobility for the poor a political priority. Clin-
ton’s signature welfare legislation further cemented the Democrat’s position, as reactionary in-
stead of visionary, reluctant instead of proactive, ambivalent instead of resolute. To become vi-





can colleagues and themselves that a federal jobs program is worth pursuing. As Roosevelt said 
in his “Second Bill of Rights” speech, a right to work and to earn an income should be a funda-
mental guarantee in the pursuit of happiness.332  
Housing policy sits under the broad umbrella of welfare, as stable shelter is a foundation-
al need for all people. The second chapter focuses on two areas of federal housing policy which 
have proven ineffective at supporting long-term goals for individuals and families: the mortgage 
interest tax deduction and the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher. Although commonly per-
ceived as an incentive to homebuyers, this perception has not borne out in reality. In fact, the 
MID overwhelmingly benefits upper-income households, subsidizing expansive single-family 
construction including second homes. In turn, the federal government misses out on $60 billion 
in annual revenue as the gap between black and white homeownership reaches its highest levels 
in over fifty years. As the MID has become an untouchable fixture in both parties’ platforms, the 
HCV has similarly become an ingrained fixture in the nation’s housing policy over the decades. 
Like the MID, the HCV program has proven ineffectual at transitioning people out of govern-
ment subsidized housing and into long-term financial independence and stability. The program is 
presently corrupted by landlord overcharging, high administrative costs, and other inefficiencies. 
As the nation’s largest housing program serving 2.1 million households, the HCV is well posi-
tioned to provide wide-scale government intervention on the path towards self-sufficiency and 
social mobility. 
Both the MID and HCV require broad-based changes to turn them into programs which 
promote homeownership among low-income populations and it is this segment of the population 
that the government should be subsidizing homeownership for, not the upper-class. Low-income 
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families have the most to gain from the wealth which accrues with each year of homeownership. 
Therefore, the MID should be eliminated or significantly reformed to target its benefits and rev-
enues towards subsidizing transitions from renting to owning. The HCV should also be reformed 
to include more pathways to homeownership by expanding the existing Family Self-Sufficiency 
Program which has demonstrated success in reducing government aid use and increasing partici-
pants’ household savings. As of 2014, the FSS program served 57,087 families meaning there is 
room for considerable expansion considering the total 3.5 million families aided by federal hous-
ing subsidies.333 The existing Section 8 Homeownership Program should also be considered for 
expansion as this comparably smaller program has also demonstrated positive impacts on partic-
ipants’ abilities to transition to homeownership.334 
In addition to promoting low-income homeownership and social mobility through re-
forms to the MID and HCV program, individual development accounts also offer a vehicle for 
savings and wealth-building. Research bears out that IDAs are an effective means of promoting 
low-income savings and homeownership while also reducing the likelihood of foreclosure. 
Through the combination of matching deposits and financial counseling, IDAs can provide par-
ticipants with the necessary support and motivation to save for future assets. As part of a com-
prehensive approach to assets-based welfare, the second paper also researched the outcomes of 
increasing the federal minimum wage. While there is debate as to how increasing the minimum 
wage to a higher living standard of $10-15 would impact the overall economy, many leading 
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scholars and the CBO highlight that employment rates would not be adversely affected and if 
they are, the net gains for low-income workers would outweigh the costs. In terms of remediat-
ing the racial wealth gap, increasing the federal minimum wage would have a significant positive 
impact on people of color, specifically women of color.  
By expanding participation in IDAs, coupled with raising the federal minimum wage, 
low-income households would be in a much stronger position to save for future asset acquisi-
tions. In particular, savings for homeownership is advisable because in spite of the recent fore-
closure crisis, housing continues to remain a wise investment for all Americans, including people 
of color. Homeownership adds to individuals’ overall net worth year over year while providing 
financial security in the form of equity and appreciation. Because of the inherent risks of home-
ownership and the particular forms of discrimination experienced by buyers of color, it is vital 
for the federal government also enhance oversight and promote equitable investment within the 
lending industry. There is immediate opportunity for action through the ongoing revisions of the 
Community Reinvestment Act and through heightened enforcement of the Fair Housing Act un-
der the “affirmative furthering” rule.  
 Turning now to a broader discussion of recommendations to achieve greater social mobil-
ity, it is important to flesh out more details as well as political realities. Beginning with the call 
for jobs guarantee, history suggests that full employment is an effective policy choice. Beginning 
with the New Deal to the Great Recession, when the federal government intervenes to create 
jobs, economic hardship is significantly reduced.335 Considering that the federal reserve is al-
ready under a mandate to pursue full employment through the 1978 Full Employment and Bal-
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anced Growth Act, Congress should learn from these past interventions to create the necessary 
infrastructure for permanent full employment. One such proposal is the National Investment 
Employment Corps (NIEC) put forth by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. The NIEC 
would include a job guarantee with entry wages at a minimum hourly wage of $11.83 (2018 fig-
ures), indexed to inflation, including opportunities for advancement. Additional benefits include: 
retirement plans, paid family and sick leave, earned vacation time, and health insurance.336 For 
black workers who consistently experience double the rate of unemployment as white workers, a 
national employment strategy would have an outsized positive impact.337 
 There is increasing political support for a federal jobs guarantee, led by Senator Cory 
Booker (D-NJ) and Senator Bernie Sanders (D-VT). Senator Booker’s bill, the “Federal Jobs 
Guarantee Development Act of 2019”, calls on the Secretary of Labor to establish pilot job guar-
antee programs and funding to entities with higher than 150% of the unemployment rate.338 
Similar legislation is being sponsored by Rep. Bonnie Watson Coleman (D-NJ) in the House of 
Representatives.339 The demands for economic justice are rising as the pandemic lays bare anew 
the racial inequalities and unemployment disparities in the American workplace340 As the econ-
omist Pavlina Tchernerva, points out: a right to a job would  “serve as a preventative policy that 
inoculates against the vast economic, social and political costs of unemployment” such as that 
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the country is experiencing today.341 A national jobs guarantee would also mitigate any potential 
fallout from losses in employment due to increases in the federal minimum wage.   
 While the majority of the American public supports raising the minimum wage, reducing 
income inequality, and a universal jobs program there remain real political obstacles.342 With 
concern to a universal job guarantee, conservatives are apprehensive about the cost, performance 
of public jobs programs, and the ability of workers to transition to the private sector.343 There is 
similar reluctance towards increasing the federal minimum wage among conservatives, who wor-
ry about potential job losses, diminished business investment, increased automation, and higher 
costs for consumers.344 Finally, instead of pursuing a matching savings account policy through 
IDAs, conservatives favor the Universal Savings Account model which does not include a gov-
ernment match for deposits and allows participation across regardless of income.345  
In general, the majority of Republican voters do not think it is the federal government’s 
responsibility to reduce income inequality though four in ten do believe the economic divide is 
too large.346 And though the majority of voters support the Black Lives Matter movement with 
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an increase of 28 percent over the past two years, most Republican voters are opposed to the 
movement’s calls for various forms of racial justice.347 With the opposition among conservative 
political leaders and the relative ambivalence amongst Republican voters on issues of equality, 
the Democratic Party has significant work to do to convince both their colleagues and the elec-
torate to take up the mantle of reform. It will in fact be vital to demonstrate to all voters that in-
vesting in social mobility is not a pipe dream, but a necessity which can be achieved by drawing 
on untapped sources of funding in the tax code. 
The current federal tax code includes an imbalanced set of expenditures and low rates 
which privilege the wealthy to the detriment of the poor. To enact progressive policies, Congress 
must also enact a truly progressive tax code. As stated above, the mortgage interest tax deduction 
must be eliminated, significantly curtailed, or targeted towards low and middle income Ameri-
cans, allowing the federal government to potentially recoup $60 billion annually in missed reve-
nues. Given that most people feel that the wealthy do not pay their fair share in taxes, there is 
political will to enact higher rates on the highest earners.348 It will be important to educate voters 
on the history of tax code as well, since most Americans are misinformed about how today’s 
rates compare to those only four decades ago when the top earners paid nearly twice as much as 
they do today.349 Returning to the 70% tax rate for income earned above $10 million would re-
sult in revenues ranging from nearly $300-$700 billion over the course of one decade.350  
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Further sources of new revenue include increasing the capital gains tax rate. Adopting 
leading Democratic presidential candidate and former Vice President Joe Biden’s plan, which 
would treat capital gains as ordinary income for those earning more than $1 million year, elimi-
nate the step-up rule, and double the top-rate from 23.8 percent to 43.4 percent, would result in 
an additional $378-$500 billion in revenue over the next decade.351 Finally, enacting a new in-
heritance tax to replace the anemic estate tax would strike at the core of the country’s racialized 
social mobility, aided and abetted by intergenerational transfers of wealth. Currently the estate 
tax raises just over $15 billion in revenue annually; meaning inherited wealth is taxed at 1/7th the 
rate of typical income. By enacting a progressive inheritance tax that includes a lifetime exemp-
tion of $2.5 million, the government could conservatively raise $337 billion in the next decade. 
This figure would rise in accordance with lower exemption levels.352 It is therefore well within 
the government’s means to prioritize and pay for new and expanded programming which would 
serve low-income social mobility. 
Sure, call me any ugly name you choose— 
The steel of freedom does not stain. 
From those who live like leeches on the people's lives, 
We must take back our land again, 
America! 
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In his final appeal of “Let America Be America Again,” Hughes calls on the vulnerable 
and exploited to retake the land that belongs to them equally. Doing so requires holding the fed-
eral government accountable for policies which enabled the current racial and class disparities to 
grow unabated. The presently stratified society disempowers the vast majority of Americans and 
renders futile the promise of equal opportunity. Political leaders must reform outdated tax, wel-
fare, and housing policies which disproportionately aid the wealthy while effecting little class 
mobility among the poor. And they must enact new policies which invest in the social mobility 
of low-income Americans and create new paths towards financial security and wealth, especially 
for people of color. Without federal leadership, there is no reason why race or household income 
will not continue to determine childrens’ life courses into the future. As Hughes writes, the time 
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